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QUESTION PRESENTED
When is a patent’s reference to a computer, or
computer-implemented service like the Internet,
sufficient to make an unpatentable abstract concept
patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101?
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R ULE 29.6 STATEMENT
WildTangent, Inc. has no parent company and no
publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock.
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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner, WildTangent, Inc. (WildTangent)
respectfully petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari
to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
This Court’s order granting certiorari, vacating the
judgment, and remanding in light of Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012), is reported at 132 S. Ct.
2431 (App. 68a). The opinion of the court of appeals
following remand (App. 1a-39a) is available at 2013 U.S.
App. LEXIS 12715. The court of appeals’ original
opinion (App. 40a-53a) is reported at 657 F.3d 1323.
The opinion of the district court (App. 54a-67a) is
available at 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93453.
JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered its judgment following
this Court’s remand on June 21, 2013. App. 1a. This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Article I, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution and 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b) and 101 are
reprinted in the appendix hereto. App. 73a-75a.
INTRODUCTION
Twice in recent terms, this Court has had to review
and set aside the Federal Circuit’s decisions about the
scope of patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
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§ 101, after concluding that the Federal Circuit failed
to heed the Supreme Court’s guidance on this issue.
Both cases involved situations where the Court had
asked the Federal Circuit to reconsider its decision in
light of this Court’s intervening decisions calling for a
more rigorous analysis under § 101, and both times the
Federal Circuit adhered to its prior ruling—
necessitating this Court’s plenary review. See Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.
Ct. 1289 (2012); Association for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); see also
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (affirming
judgment, but rejecting Federal Circuit’s § 101 test). 1
This case fits the same pattern. At issue is the
eligibility under § 101 of a patent that seeks a
monopoly over an indisputably abstract idea—using
advertising as currency—over the Internet. After the
Federal Circuit initially held that the patent at issue
was eligible under § 101, this Court granted
WildTangent’s petition for certiorari, vacated the
judgment, and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Mayo. App. 68a. In Mayo, this Court unanimously
directed the Federal Circuit to apply the § 101 inquiry
with more rigor. On remand in this case, however, the
1 Members of the Federal Circuit have themselves recognized
this trend. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d
1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting in part) (“The
Supreme Court has taken a number of our recent decisions and, in
each instance, concluded that the claims at issue were not patenteligible.” (citing Bilski, Mayo, Myriad)); CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice
Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Prost, J.,
dissenting) (“Just a few months ago, the Supreme Court reversed
us in a § 101 case for a second time in the last three terms, hinting
(not so tacitly) that our subject matter patentability test is not
sufficiently exacting.” (citing Mayo and Bilski)).
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Federal Circuit not only reached the same result as it
did before Mayo, but did so in a decision that goes even
further than its initial decision in dismantling § 101 as a
meaningful screening device. Indeed, although he
agreed with the bottom-line result, one Judge on the
panel below took the unusual step of writing separately
to explain his belief that the Federal Circuit “should
concisely and faithfully follow” Mayo rather than
“set[ting] forth [its] own independent views, however
valid [it] considers them to be.” Id. at 36a-37a.
The decision in this case is particularly problematic
because it seeks to fill the void left in the wake of the
Federal Circuit’s failed en banc hearing in CLS Bank
International v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., which produced
multiple conflicting opinions on the patent eligibility of
computer-implemented claims but no majority
rationale. 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The decision
in this case is written in sweeping doctrinal terms that
sharply conflict not only with this Court’s precedents
but with the Federal Circuit’s prior decisions. Here,
the Federal Circuit frankly recognized that the “idea
that advertising can be used as a form of currency”—
“is abstract,” just like the unpatentable abstract idea in
Bilski. App. 28a. But the court held that the “broadly
claimed” method at issue satisfied § 101 as a
patentable-eligible application of that abstract concept
because it “invokes computers and application of
computer technology” and “involves an extensive
computer interface.” Id. at 35a, 29a, 33a. Yet the
patent itself does not reference any “computer
interface,” much less specify computer programming.
Instead, it merely claims a method in which one step is
conducted “at an Internet website.” Id. at 2a.
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The Federal Circuit’s decision in this case
establishes a virtually insurmountable rule that
computer-related method claims are patent eligible.
That result and the Federal Circuit’s new § 101
framework directly conflict with this Court’s decision
in Mayo and other precedents. The decision in this
case completely revamps the law in this area and
transforms § 101 into little more than a statutory
preordination of patent eligibility. The decision also
exacerbates the untenable conflict and confusion in the
Federal Circuit on the application of § 101 to computerrelated patents. The Federal Circuit is hopelessly
divided, and the Court should not permit this extreme
decision to set the ground rules for § 101 going
forward. Moreover, the patent eligibility of computerrelated methods is undeniably important and impacts
an increasingly important sector of the Nation’s
economy. This Court’s review is urgently needed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Patent Act
Section 101 of the Patent Act establishes the
gateway subject-matter eligibility requirement for all
patents.
It provides that “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Act further states that
“‘process’ means process, art or method, and includes a
new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material.” Id. § 100(b).
This Court has “‘long held’” that § 101 “‘contains an
important implicit exception[:] Laws of nature, natural
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phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.’”
Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at
1293) (alteration in original). These are “‘the basic
tools of scientific and technological work,’” id., and
accordingly they are “‘part of the storehouse of
knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.’” Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
These
exceptions “have defined the reach of the statute as a
matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.”
Id. And Congress—which is well aware of this Court’s
decisions—has not sought to curtail the exceptions.
B. Underlying Facts
Advertising is as old as markets. And purveyors of
goods or services have long understood that those
seeking access to copyrighted content are excellent
subjects for advertising. That is why broadcasters
decided almost as soon as television signals hit the
airways
to
imbed
advertisements
in
their
programming—effectively forcing viewers, especially
before the advent of recording devices, to watch
commercials to view programming. The patent at issue
claims that basic economic concept in the context of one
of the most significant economic developments in
history—the Internet and e-commerce marketplace.
WildTangent operates a games service that allows
consumers around the world to access downloadable,
online, and social games via the Internet. Rather than
paying to play, consumers can let an advertiser sponsor
free game play sessions. To do so, the consumer must
agree to display an advertisement before he is given
access to the game. As most users of the Internet have
experienced, numerous websites likewise restrict
access to content by prompting users to view
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advertisements before gaining access to the desired
content. Navigating such advertisements can be the
bane of using the Internet but—just like TV
commercials—such advertisements have become a
basic economic staple in the e-commerce environment.
The patent-in-suit, U.S. Patent No. 7,346,545 (the
’545 patent), issued March 18, 2008, and assigned to
respondent Ultramercial, claims exclusivity on the
basic economic concept of trading advertisement
viewing for access to content—over the Internet. See
Fed. Cir. JA 473-82. The preamble to claim 1 describes
it as a “method for distribution of products over the
Internet.” ’545 patent col. 8 l.5 (Fed. Cir. JA 481); see
also App. 2a. It lists eleven basic steps that relate to
receiving the content, selecting an advertisement, and
restricting access to the content based on
advertisement viewing. App. 2a-3a. Step three states
that the content should be offered “for sale at an
Internet website.” ’545 patent col. 8 ll.20-21 (Fed. Cir.
JA 481); see also App. 2a. Claim 8, the only other
independent claim, similarly requires listing products
“on an Internet website.” Id. col. 9 ll.3-4 (Fed. Cir. JA
482). It is undisputed that the patent does not specify
any computer programming. See App. 29a. 2

2 As the district court explained, the eleven steps are:

1) receiving media from content provider, 2) selecting an ad
after consulting an activity log to determine how many times the
ad has been played and how many more times it need be played,
3) offering media products on the Internet, 4) restricting general
public access to the media, 5) offering various media to
customers for free in exchange for their watching the selected
ad, 6) receiving a request to view the media from the Internet
user, 7) facilitating the display of the ad, 8) allowing the Internet
user access to the media, 9) same as 8 but for interactive media,
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C. District Court Litigation
In September 2009, Ultramercial filed suit in the
Central District of California, asserting that
WildTangent—along with Hulu, LLC, and YouTube,
LLC, which were later dismissed, id. at 4a—had
infringed its ’545 patent by limiting access to content
on the popular Internet websites that defendants
operate based on advertisement viewing. WildTangent
and the other defendants moved to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) on the ground that the ’545 patent does not
claim patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.
In August 2010, after receiving briefing on Bilski,
the district court granted the motion, holding that the
patent claimed an abstract idea. App. 57a-58a. The
Court explained that “the concept of advertisementmedia-exchange does not become patentable simply
because the patentee claims to have limited its
application to the Internet or computers.” Id. at 58a65a (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64
(1972)). Indeed, the court recognized, a contrary rule
would render “completely toothless” (id. at 63a) the
machine-or-transformation test that this Court
reaffirmed in Bilski is “a useful and important clue” for
determining patent eligibility. 130 S. Ct. at 3227. The
court then concluded that this case is “very similar” to
Bilski because the “core of the ’545 patent is the basic
idea that one can use advertisement as an exchange or
currency,” which is abstract, and the “added features,
examples, or limitations of the ’545 patent do not make
it patentable” because they do not “limit the patent in a

10) recording the transaction in the activity log, and
11) receiving payment from sponsor for the ad.
App. 55a; see also id. at 29a (recognizing steps).
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meaningful way.” App. 66a. Instead, the court held,
the patent here, like the one in Bilski, “discloses an
abstract idea garnished with accessories.” Id.
D . Federal Circuit’s Initial Decision
In September 2011, the Federal Circuit reversed.
In a broadly worded opinion, the court dispensed with
the machine-or-transformation test for determining
patent eligibility as having “far less application to the
inventions of the Information Age.” Id. at 46a. The
court then applied a new and heightened standard for
abstractness formulated by the Federal Circuit and
effectively supplanted § 101’s gateway screening role
with the other statutory grounds for invalidity (§§ 102,
103, 112). The court held that “‘this disqualifying
characteristic should exhibit itself so manifestly as to
override the broad statutory categories of eligible
subject matter and the statutory context that directs
primary attention on the patentability criteria of the
rest of the Patent Act.’” Id. at 47a (quoting Research
Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (emphasis added)).
Applying that understanding, the Federal Circuit
recognized that the “idea that advertising can be used
as a form of currency is abstract, just as the vague,
unapplied concept of hedging proved patent-ineligible
in Bilski.” Id. at 51a. But the court reasoned that the
’545 patent discloses a patentable “practical
application” of this idea on the ground that its steps—
which do not spell out any computer programming but
instead simply refer in passing to “an Internet
website”—are “likely to require intricate and complex
computer programming” and “clearly require specific
application to the Internet and a cyber-market
environment.” Id. at 51a (emphasis added).

9
E . This Court’s GVR Order
In May 2012—shortly after this Court decided
Mayo—the Court granted WildTangent’s petition for
certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the
case for further consideration in light of Mayo. App.
68a. In Mayo, the Court unanimously held that certain
medical diagnostic methods were not patent eligible
because they “add nothing specific to the laws of nature
other than what is well-understood, routine,
conventional activity, previously engaged in by those in
the field.” 132 S. Ct. at 1299. In the course of its
decision, the Court undertook a broad-based review of
its precedents in this area and reaffirmed that “simply
implementing a mathematical principle on a physical
machine, namely a computer, [i]s not a patentable
application of that principle.” Id. at 1301 (citing
Benson). The Court also rejected an approach that
would “substitute §§ 102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the
better established inquiry under § 101” because that
would “make the ‘law of nature’ exception to § 101
patentability a dead letter.” Id. at 1303-04.
F. En Banc Decision In CLS Bank
In October 2012—after this Court had GVR’d this
case—the Federal Circuit vacated the panel decision in
CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd.,
finding the computer-related claims at issue in that
case patent eligible under § 101 and agreed to hear the
case en banc. 484 F. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The
claims in CLS Bank cover the abstract concept of using
a computerized trading platform for reducing
“settlement risk.” Although the claims are computerimplemented and broken into several steps (including
using a “supervisory institution” and adjusted “shadow
debit records”), and although the specification refers to
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“a system called ‘INVENTICO’” and a “CONTRACT
APP,” CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685
F.3d 1341, 1343, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the claims
require the use of a computer in only a generalized
way. CLS Bank also included additional claims drawn
to systems and computer-readable medium, though the
declaratory judgment plaintiff CLS Bank had argued
that the eligibility of these claims under § 101 was tied
to the eligibility of the method claims. Id. at 1343-44.
In May 2013, the en banc court issued a per curiam
opinion and judgment in CLS Bank announcing that a
majority of the court (seven of the ten members) had
affirmed the district court’s holding that the method
claims and computer-readable media claims are not
eligible under § 101, and that an equally divided court
had affirmed the district court’s holding that the
asserted system claims are not eligible under § 101
either. In addition, a majority of the court (eight
members) concluded that the method, medium, and
system claims “should rise or fall together in the § 101
analysis.” CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1274 n.1 (Lourie, J.,
concurring). However, a majority of the court was
unable to agree on a single rationale producing that
result and the per curiam opinion was accompanied by
five separate non-majority opinions setting out
competing views of the proper analysis under § 101. 3
G. Federal Circuit’s Decision On Remand
In June 2013—not long after the en banc court
issued its judgment in CLS Bank and without

3 On July 18, 2013, the losing patent holder in CLS Bank

indicated its intention to seek certiorari and requested an
extension of time to file a petition to September 6, 2013, which was
granted. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, No. 13A95.
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requesting any additional briefing or oral argument on
this Court’s GVR order—the panel in this case acted to
fill the doctrinal void left by the splintered decision in
CLS Bank by issuing a strongly worded decision
reaffirming the court’s initial decision finding that the
claims were patent eligible under § 101 and mapping
out a sweeping set of guidelines for analyzing the
eligibility of computer-implemented patents under
§ 101. As a practical matter, the only substantive
change to the court’s § 101 analysis in light of Mayo
compared to its initial analysis of the claims before
Mayo was the creation of additional barriers to
showing abstractness under the new decision.
The court framed the issue with a heavy thumb—if
not truck—on the scale for patent eligibility,
emphasizing that it will be “rare” and is “normally”
“improper” to dismiss a patent infringement suit on
§ 101 grounds, that claim construction “normally will be
required,” and that a party must demonstrate
abstractness by clear and convincing evidence. App.
4a-8a. The court relegated § 101 to a “limited role” that
is “merely a threshold check” and “no more than a
‘coarse eligibility filter.’”
Id. at 8a-10a (citation
omitted). Instead, the court viewed the “substantive
conditions of eligibility”—§ 102 (novelty), § 103
(obviousness), § 112 (adequate disclosure)—as doing
the work of weeding out meritless claims. Id. The
court downplayed the longstanding exceptions to §101
and asserted that they “should apply narrowly” and
“must be rare.” Id. at 12a. The court again dismissed
the machine-or-transformation test as having “far less
application” to technological patents. Id. at 14a.
The court discussed this Court’s cases interpreting
the abstract idea exception, including Mayo, Bilski,
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and Benson, id. at 15a-25a, and concluded its discussion
by proclaiming various “guideposts specific to
computer-implemented inventions,” id. at 25a. Among
other things, the court ruled that “the fact that a claim
is limited by a tie to a computer is an important
indication of patent eligibility,” and that “‘inventions
with specific applications or improvements to
technologies in the marketplace are not likely to be so
abstract that they override the statutory language and
framework of the Patent Act.’”
Id. at 25a-27a
(emphasis added) (quoting Research Corp.).
In analyzing the claims under that framework, the
court recognized that it is undisputed that the “idea
that advertising can be used as a form of currency is
abstract,” similar to the concept of hedging that was
patent ineligible in Bilski. Id. at 28a. But the court
found that the patent claims an eligible application of
that concept because it “invokes computers and
applications of computer technology.” Id. at 29a-30a.
The court explained that it could “see” that the patent’s
steps “require intricate and complex computer
programming,” id.—even though the patent does not
disclose any such programming. Focusing on two
figures in the specification—rather than the claim
language—the court concluded that the patent
“involves an extensive computer interface,” making it
patent eligible. Id. at 30a-33a. The court added the
caveat that it did “not define the level of programming
complexity required before a computer implemented
method can be patent-eligible,” even though it had not
identified any programming in the patent. Id. at 33a.
The court disavowed holding that “use of an Internet
website to practice such a method is . . . sufficient in
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every case to satisfy § 101,” but the court did not
identify anything else that set this patent apart. Id.
Finally, the court asserted that the claims “are not
highly generalized,” despite recognizing in the very
next paragraph that the “broadly claimed method” at
issue “does not specify a particular mechanism for
delivering media content to the consumer.” Id. at 34a35a. In reaching this conclusion, the court again
substituted § 112’s written description requirement to
do the work of § 101. Id. at 35a-36a. Ultimately, the
court concluded that “the claimed invention is not ‘so
manifestly abstract as to override the statutory
language of section 101.’” Id. at 36a (emphasis added)
(quoting Research Corp.).
Judge Lourie concurred in the decision, but wrote
separately because he believed the court did not
“concisely and faithfully” follow Mayo. Id. at 36a-37a.
He stated: “It is our obligation to attempt to follow the
Supreme Court’s guidance in Mayo rather than to set
forth our own independent views, however valid we
may consider them to be.” Id. at 37a. He agreed with
the majority’s conclusion that the claims are patent
eligible but disagreed with its reasoning, explaining
that “[w]hile a computer or complex computer
program, as discussed by the majority opinion, may be
necessary to perform the method, it is not what the
claim specifically requires and thus should not be the
focus of the analysis.” Id. at 38a-39a. Instead, he
simply asserted without explanation that the “added
limitations in these claims represent significantly more
than the underlying abstract idea of using advertising
as an exchange or currency.” Id. at 39a.
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R EASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
In few cases is the need for this Court’s
intervention so apparent. The proper application of
§ 101’s gateway subject-matter eligibility requirement
to computer-implemented patent claims is a matter of
extraordinary importance—and is becoming more
important virtually by the day as the number of
computer-implemented method patents explodes. The
sweeping decision below not only largely disregards
this Court’s GVR order but sharply conflicts with this
Court’s precedents. The Federal Circuit, as its recent
en banc experiment in CLS Bank underscores, is
hopelessly divided on the question presented. And
whereas the Federal Circuit’s free-for-all in CLS Bank
establishes no law beyond its judgment, the decision in
this case fills the vacuum left by CLS Bank with a
sweeping legal framework that eliminates § 101 as a
meaningful screening mechanism for computerimplemented claims. Certiorari is warranted.
I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS
FUNDAMENTALLY OUT OF STEP WITH
THIS COURT’S PRECEDENTS
As one Federal Circuit Judge has observed, in
Mayo and other recent decisions, this Court has
“hint[ed] (not so tacitly) that [the Federal Circuit’s]
subject matter patentability test is not sufficiently
exacting.” CLS Bank, 685 F.3d at 1356 (Prost, J.,
dissenting). In this case, the Court asked the Federal
Circuit to reconsider its initial decision in light of
Mayo. But rather than heed the guidance in Mayo, the
Federal Circuit used the occasion to pronounce its
“independent views” on § 101. App. 36a-37a (Lourie, J.,
concurring).
The Federal Circuit’s “independent
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views” on the proper role of § 101 and how it applies to
computer-implemented methods directly conflict with
Mayo and this Court’s other precedents. Instead of
treating § 101 as a meaningful screening mechanism to
weed out ineligible subject matter, the Federal Circuit
diminished § 101’s role so that virtually anything that
qualifies as a “process” will pass muster. To make
matters worse, in direct conflict with Mayo, Bilski, and
Benson, the Federal Circuit in this case has erected a
legal framework that effectively gives computerimplemented methods a “free pass” through § 101.
A . The Federal Circuit’s Conception Of The
Role Of § 101 Is Sharply At Odds With
This Court’s Precedents
The Federal Circuit’s decision in this case revamps
the § 101 inquiry established by this Court and all but
eliminates § 101 as a genuine screening tool.
1. In stark contrast with the robust role reaffirmed
in Mayo, the Federal Circuit below held that § 101 has
only a “limited role” and is “no more than a ‘coarse
eligibility filter.’” App. 9a-10a (citation omitted); see
also id. at 6a (“‘coarse’ gauge” (citation omitted)). The
court asserted that “[b]road inclusivity is the
congressional goal of § 101” and the “broadly
permissive nature” of § 101 is limited only by “narrow
judicial” exceptions that “should apply narrowly” and
“must be rare.” Id. at 10a-12a. According to the court,
instead of § 101, the “substantive criteria for
patentability”—§§ 102, 103, and 112—do the real work
in screening claims. Id. at 10a. And the court explicitly
substituted § 112 for § 101: “[t]he ‘coarse eligibility
filter’ of § 101 is not the statutory tool to address
concerns about vagueness, indefinite disclosure, or lack
of enablement, as these infirmities are expressly
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addressed by § 112.” Id. at 35a. In other words, while
the court purportedly grounded its decision in the
statute, the court effectively re-wrote the statute.
This Court emphatically rejected that conception of
§ 101 in Mayo. Indeed, in Mayo, the Court issued a
“unanimous directive to apply the patentable subject
matter test with more vigor.” CLS Bank, 685 F.3d at
1356 (Prost, J., dissenting). Among other things, Mayo
reaffirms that the exceptions to § 101 recognized by
this Court are central to the § 101 analysis. In Mayo,
the Court stressed that it has “long held” that § 101
“contains an important implicit exception” that “‘[l]aws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are
not patentable.” 132 S. Ct. at 1293 (emphasis added);
see also Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116 (same). Far from
insignificant,
these
exceptions—the
Court
emphasized—“have defined the reach of the statute as
a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150
years.” Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (emphasis added).
Critically, after reviewing its past cases applying
§ 101, the Court reaffirmed in Mayo that § 101
performs a “screening function” separate and apart
from other provisions of the Patent Act. 132 S. Ct. at
1303-04. This Court explicitly rejected an approach—
like the one adopted by the Federal Circuit below—
that would “shift the patent eligibility inquiry entirely
to these later sections” because it would make the
longstanding exceptions to § 101 patentability a “dead
letter” and is “not consistent with prior law.” Id.
Moreover, in direct contrast to the Federal Circuit’s
treatment of § 112 as subsuming § 101, this Court held
that a patent embodying “a law of nature (or its
equivalent)” could satisfy § 112 and yet still flunk § 101
because of the risk that the patent “would significantly
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impede future innovation.” Id. at 1304 (emphasis
added). The Federal Circuit directly contravened
Mayo by effectively eliminating § 101’s own screening
role in favor of other grounds for invalidity.
The United States has explicitly rejected the
Federal Circuit’s position. See U.S. Amicus Br., CLS
Bank, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (No. 2011-1301)
(en banc), 2012 WL 6838192 (“U.S. CLS Bank Br.”).
The government has recognized that Bilski and Mayo
direct courts to approach the exceptions to § 101 “more
rigorously.” Id. at 1. The Federal Circuit’s approach is
just the opposite. The United States also recognized
Mayo’s clear command that “§ 101 performs a
screening function that these other provisions”—
§§ 102, 103, and 112—“do not.” Id. at 20. 4
2. The Federal Circuit also contravened this
Court’s precedents by adopting a heightened standard
for abstractness—ratcheting up the burden in
establishing that a claim is ineligible under § 101
because it is abstract. The court below ultimately held
that the claimed invention in this case is patent eligible
because it “is not ‘so manifestly abstract as to override
the statutory language of section 101.’” App. 36a
(emphasis added) (quoting Research Corp.); see also id.
at 27a (“‘so abstract’” (quoting Research Corp.)).
Neither Mayo nor this Court’s other precedents
have applied anything like this heightened, “manifest
abstractness” standard.
The question under this
Court’s longstanding precedent is whether the subject

4 While varying in some respects with WildTangent’s position

on the role of § 101, the government’s position in CLS Bank calls
for a more rigorous role for § 101 than the Federal Circuit did here
and rejects key elements of the Federal Circuit’s framework.
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matter is an “abstract idea”—period. See Myriad, 133
S. Ct. at 2116; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293; Bilski, 130 S.
Ct. at 3225, 3230. There is no basis for increasing the
standard from abstractness to manifest abstractness.
If anything, this Court’s precedents require tilting the
inquiry in the opposite direction because they require a
showing that the patent adds “significantly more” to
the law of nature (or abstract idea) claimed in order to
satisfy § 101. See, e.g., Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (citing
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), Bilski), 1297
(patent must do “significantly more than simply
describe the[] natural relations”). By contrast, the
“manifest abstractness” standard is simply “an escape
hatch” from § 101. CLS Bank, 685 F.3d at 1357 (Prost,
J., dissenting) (rejecting court’s application of
analogous “‘manifestly evident’ standard”).
The United States has unequivocally rejected the
Federal Circuit’s heightened standard for abstractness,
which originated in Research Corp. The government
“does not believe it is appropriate to impose a
requirement of ‘manifest’ abstractness for invalidity
under § 101.” U.S. CLS Bank Br. 15 (citing Research
Corp.). Indeed, as the government has explained, “[a]n
additional, substantive requirement of ‘manifest’
abstractness under § 101 has no basis in the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence and would arguably be at odds
with the exception itself, which prohibits patents on all
abstract ideas, not just those that are manifestly
abstract.” Id. (first emphasis added).
3. The Federal Circuit further diminished § 101’s
role by repeatedly emphasizing that it should not be
the basis for dismissal at the pleading stage. The court
admonished district courts that dismissal on § 101
grounds should be “rare,” “the exception,” and is
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“normally” “improper” and “inappropriate.” App. 4a7a, 17a.
The court based this new rule on its
overgeneralized assertion that the § 101 analysis is
“rife with underlying factual issues” and thus “claim
construction normally will be required.” Id. at 5a-6a;
see also id. at 17a, 21a. But that is certainly not true in
all cases, and there is no basis for adopting a
categorical rule (or virtually categorical rule) against
invoking § 101 at the pleading stage. Indeed, in this
very case, the Federal Circuit recognized that there are
no such factual issues and that “the subject matter at
stake and its eligibility does not require formal claim
construction.” Id. at 7a-8a; accord id. at 29a; id. at 38a
(Lourie, J., concurring). The court’s observations,
therefore, are not apt in this case, and serve no purpose
other than to discourage district courts from testing
patent claims under § 101’s eligibility requirement.
Elimination of § 101 as a defense at the pleading
stage conflicts with this Court’s precedents. Section
101 is a “threshold test,” Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225, and
a “screening” device, Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303. It will
lose its utility as such if parties have to go through
expensive discovery and formal claim construction
before § 101 patent eligibility can be determined. This
Court has repeatedly recognized that other threshold
issues must be adjudicated as soon as possible. See
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007)
(deficiency of a claim should “‘be exposed at the point
of minimum expenditure of time and money by the
parties and the court.’” (citations omitted)); Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (“‘[W]e repeatedly
have stressed the importance of resolving immunity
questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.’”
(citation omitted)).
Furthermore, this Court has
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previously held that patents are ineligible under § 101
without formal claim construction. Bilski, 130 S. Ct.
3218. The Federal Circuit’s attempt to close the door
on § 101 challenges at the pleading stage is unfounded. 5
In all these ways, the Federal Circuit’s decision in
this case establishes a far different—and less
exacting—role for § 101 than the one recognized by this
Court in Mayo and other decisions.
B. The Federal Circuit’s Decision Effectively
Gives Computer-Implemented Claims A
“Free Pass” Through § 101
The Federal Circuit’s framework is written in broad
terms that could apply to all patents regardless of their
subject matter, but its decision establishes a virtually
insurmountable rule of patent eligibility under § 101 for
computer-implemented claims in particular. That rule
is sharply at odds with this Court’s precedents.
1. The decision below directly contravenes the key
teaching
of
Mayo—that
“simply
appending
conventional steps, specified at a high level of
generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas cannot make those laws, phenomena, and
ideas patentable.” 132 S. Ct. at 1300. Instead, Mayo
holds, a patent must claim an “inventive concept” that
does “significantly more” than the law of nature (or
abstract idea) itself. Id. at 1294; see CLS Bank, 685
F.3d at 1356 (Mayo “made clear what had been written
5 The Federal Circuit also required “clear and convincing
evidence” of abstractness, even though it recognized that there
are no disputed factual issues precluding the § 101 analysis here.
See, e.g., App. 6a, 14a. But this Court has never applied that
evidentiary standard in the § 101 analysis, and it could not apply
to the legal determination of abstractness under § 101.
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between the lines before: It is not sufficient to put an
abstract idea into use with ‘[p]urely “conventional or
obvious” “pre-solution activity.”’” (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (Prost, J., dissenting)). The
decision below flouts that principle by holding that a
reference to a “conventional” function that can be
performed by any general-purpose computer straight
off the shelf at Best Buy or the Apple Store—accessing
an Internet website—is sufficient to transform an
abstract idea into a patent eligible invention.
In Mayo, the medical diagnostic method failed that
test because it “simply tells doctors to: (1) measure
(somehow) the current level of the relevant metabolite,
(2) use particular (unpatentable) laws of nature (which
the claim sets forth) to calculate the current
toxicity/inefficacy limits, and (3) reconsider the drug
dosage in light of the law.” 132 S. Ct. at 1299. The
Court explained that “[t]hese instructions add nothing
specific to the laws of nature other than what is wellunderstood, routine, conventional activity, previously
engaged in by those in the field,” but instead “the effect
is simply to tell doctors to apply the law somehow
when treating their patients.” Id. at 1299-1300. The
“determining” step failed because it “is set forth in
highly general language covering all processes . . .
including later discovered processes that measure
metabolite levels in new ways.” Id. at 1302.
So too here. Indeed, if anything the patent at issue
here is even more general than the one held ineligible
in Mayo and at most invokes a routine use of a generalpurpose computer. The Federal Circuit’s decision that
the claims at issue are patent eligible thus defies this
Court’s ruling in Mayo.
The Federal Circuit
emphasized that the claimed invention must entail an
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“extensive computer interface.” App. 33a. But the
patent does not specify any computer programming
and, instead, simply refers to “providing the media
products for sale at an Internet website.” ’545 patent
col. 8 ll.20-21 (Fed. Cir. JA 481). That “limit” could not
be any more generalized. Reliance on the patent’s
reference to the Internet (or the generic computer
“interface” required to access the Internet) to satisfy
§ 101 is precisely what this Court prohibited in Mayo
when it stated that “simply appending conventional
steps, specified at a high level of generality, to . . .
abstract ideas cannot make those laws, phenomena, and
ideas patentable.” 132 S. Ct. at 1300.
According to the Federal Circuit, “many of [the
claim’s] steps require”—or “likely” require, App. 49a—
“intricate and complex computer programming,” and
“several steps plainly require that the method be
performed through computers, on the internet, and in a
cyber-market environment.” Id. at 29a-30a. But the
patent itself does not contain any specific computer
programming. Judge Lourie chided the majority for
relying on “a computer or complex computer program”
because “it is not what the claim specifically requires
and thus should not be the focus of the analysis.” Id. at
38a-39a. And even the majority recognized that the
“broadly claimed” method at issue “does not specify a
particular mechanism for delivering media content to
the consumer.” Id. at 35a. The Federal Circuit’s
reliance
on
non-existent
“complex
computer
programming” to transform an unpatentable abstract
idea into a patent-eligible one is even more problematic
than the analysis this Court rejected in Mayo.
Just as “one must do more than simply state the law
of nature while adding the words ‘apply it,’” Mayo, 132
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S. Ct. at 1294, one must do more than simply state the
abstract idea and add the words “apply it on a
computer”—or “over the Internet.” The determining
step in Mayo was too general because it “cover[ed] all
processes” “including later discovered processes” for
measuring metabolites. Here, the steps in the ’545
patent are too general because they do not specify any
computer programming and thus could cover any
programming that would effectuate the broadly
claimed
process,
including
later
discovered
programming. Ultramercial’s patent does not add
anything new or inventive about how to use
advertising as currency over the Internet. Instead, by
adding the generic phrase “at an Internet website” to
an otherwise abstract idea, Ultramercial is simply
trying to monopolize the abstract idea of trading
advertisement viewing for content over the Internet,
claiming dominion over inventions that Ultramercial
never conceived and that must be implemented
through computer programming not specified in the
’545 patent. Granting Ultramercial exclusive patent
rights when it has not added any “inventive concept” is
antithetical to the purposes of the patent system, see
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1301-03, if not beyond the
scope of the Patent Clause, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit noted that
delivery of the media to the consumer could be
accomplished through numerous well-known means:
“FTP downloads, email, or real-time streaming.” App.
37a. Under Mayo, the addition of “well-understood,
routine, conventional activity” does not make the
abstract idea patent eligible. 132 S. Ct. at 1299-1300.
2. The Court’s decision in Mayo also sharpens the
direct conflict between the decision below and this
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Court’s decisions in Bilski, Flook, and Benson, which
also held that an abstract idea does not become patent
eligible simply by “limiting” it to a particular field or
technological environment or adding conventional
steps. Holding that such claims are patent eligible
would let “patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the
draftsman’s art,’” id. at 1294 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S.
at 593)—and here, a simple reference to “an Internet
website” or generic computer implementation.
As the Court explained in Mayo, the abstract idea
of hedging at issue in Bilski did not become patent
eligible by limiting it “to use in commodities and
energy markets” and adding “‘well known random
analysis techniques.’” Id. at 1301 (quoting Bilski, 130
S. Ct. at 3224). In Flook, the abstract idea of using a
formula to compute an updated alarm limit did not
become patent eligible merely by adding “well known”
limits, including “the use of computers for ‘automatic
monitoring alarming.’” Id. at 1299 (quoting Flook, 437
U.S. at 594). Unlike the patent-eligible process in
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), the process in
Flook “did not ‘explain how the variables used in the
formula were to be selected, nor did the [claim] contain
any disclosure relating to chemical processes at work
or the means of setting off an alarm or adjusting the
alarm limit.’” 132 S. Ct. at 1299 (alteration in original)
(quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192 n.14). These limits, the
Mayo Court reiterated, were too general and thus “did
not limit the claim to a particular invention.” Id. And
in Benson, the abstract idea of converting binary-coded
decimal numbers to pure binary did not become patent
eligible “simply [by] implementing [it] on a physical
machine, namely a computer.” Id. at 1301.
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In stark contrast, the Federal Circuit held that the
concededly abstract idea of using advertisements as
currency did become patent eligible simply by
“limiting” it to the Internet through the highly general
statement that a product be offered “at an Internet
website.” That result stands in jarring contravention
with the outcomes in Mayo, Bilski, Flook, and Benson.
Indeed, under the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, the
abstract concept of hedging risk in Bilski would have
become patent eligible if the claim had simply required
that the commodities transactions be carried out “over
the Internet”—which is where they would most
naturally have occurred in any event.
“Given the ubiquity of computers in contemporary
life, allowing a process to become patentable simply
because it is computer-implemented or invokes the use
of the Internet would render the subject-matter
eligibility criteria contained in section 101 virtually
meaningless.” MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672
F.3d 1250, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Mayer, J., dissenting).
For computer-implemented methods, the decision
below is tantamount to a return to the flawed regime
established by the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank
& Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., under
which any invention that produced a “‘useful, concrete,
and tangible result’” is patent eligible. 149 F.3d 1368,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). This Court
squarely rejected that test in Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231,
recognizing that it resulted in the “granting of patents
that ‘ranged from the somewhat ridiculous to the truly
absurd,’” id. at 3259 (Breyer, J., concurring in
judgment). There is no basis to condone a return to
that already rejected open-door policy here.
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The United States has also recognized that this
Court’s precedents do not permit broad rules of
eligibility (or ineligibility) for computer-implemented
claims. As the government has explained, “categorical,
bright-line tests for eligibility under § 101 are not
appropriate,” so “recitation in a claim that . . . a method
is implemented by a computer . . . no longer can serve
as a virtually-dispositive indicator of patent eligibility.”
U.S. CLS Bank Br. 5-6. The claim must include
“meaningful limitations” of the abstract idea, which
does not include “a mere field-of-use limitation, a
tangential reference to technology, [or] insignificant
extra-solution activity.” Id. at 7. More specifically, the
“mere fact that a computer may be a ‘necessary’
element in the claim” and “routine uses of a computer”
for its “ordinary functions” do not meaningfully limit
claims for § 101 purposes. Id. at 11-12. The Federal
Circuit’s reliance on the use of the Internet in this case
is plainly at odds with this position.
3. The Federal Circuit’s adoption of an industryspecific framework for the technology industry also
conflicts with this Court’s precedents. The Federal
Circuit stated that “‘inventions with specific
applications or improvements to technologies in the
marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they
override the statutory language and framework of the
Patent Act.’” App. 27a (emphasis added) (quoting
Research Corp.).
The court further stated that
“[b]ecause technology is ever-changing and evolves in
unforeseeable ways, this court gives substantial weight
to the statutory reluctance to list any new, nonobvious, and fully disclosed subject matter as beyond
the reach of Title 35.” Id. at 15a (emphasis added). As
the United States has explained, however, “this Court
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has traditionally eschewed” the use of an “industryspecific calculus.” U.S. Amicus Br. 32, Myriad, 133
S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398). In Mayo, the Court
reiterated that it “must hesitate before departing from
established general legal rules lest a new protective
rule that seems to suit the needs of one field produce
unforeseen results in another.” 132 S. Ct. at 1304.
There is no reason to carve out a special rule for
computer- or Internet-related claims.
Nor is there any basis to dispense in this context
with the machine-or-transformation test as a tool for
gauging eligibility under § 101. The Federal Circuit
again dismissed the machine-or-transformation test as
an anachronism for “inventions of the Information
Age,” relying on two statements from Bilski that were
not adopted by a majority of this Court. App. 46a; see
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223 n.1. That conflicts with Bilski
and Mayo, which reaffirmed that “the machine-ortransformation test is a useful and important clue, an
investigative tool, for determining whether some
claimed inventions are processes under § 101.” Bilski,
130 S. Ct. at 3227; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303.
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IS HOPELESSLY
DIVIDED ON THE APPLICATION OF § 101
TO COMPUTER-RELATED PATENTS
As the extraordinary outcome in CLS Bank
underscores, the Federal Circuit is hopelessly and
intransigently divided on the application of § 101 to
computer-related patents. The en banc court in CLS
Bank split both as to result and rationale, producing
five different opinions, but no majority rule. The court
itself recognized that it left the application of § 101 to
computer-related patents in complete disarray.
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Chief Judge Rader observed that “[n]o portion of
any opinion issued today other than our Per Curiam
Judgment garners a majority,” thus “nothing said
today beyond our judgment has the weight of
precedent.” 717 F.3d at 1292 n.1 (dissenting in part).
Critically, even though “a majority of the judges on the
court agree that the method claims do not recite patent
eligible subject matter, no majority of those judges
agrees as to the legal rationale for that conclusion.” Id.
Judge Lourie agreed. Id. at 1274 n.1 (concurring). He
noted that the “proper application” of § 101 “to
computer-implemented inventions and in various other
fields of technology has long vexed this and other
courts” and “a framework that will provide guidance
and predictability for patent applicants and examiners,
litigants, and the courts” is “needed.” Id. at 1276-77.
But the en banc court did not supply the needed
framework. As Judge Newman lamented, the effort
“to remedy distortions flowing from inconsistent
precedent on section 101” “has failed.” Id. at 1321
(concurring in part, dissenting in part). Rather than
ameliorating the uncertainty for inventors, “[the court]
ha[s] propounded at least three incompatible
standards, devoid of consensus, serving simply to add
to the unreliability and cost of the system of patents as
an incentive for innovation.” Id. And Judges Linn and
O’Malley viewed Chief Judge Rader’s analysis of the
method claims as “internally inconsistent” with his
analysis of the system claims. Id. at 1330 (dissenting
from judgment). CLS Bank provided no guidance.
The decision in this case underscores the conflict
that exists in the Federal Circuit. It cannot be
reconciled with the judgment in CLS Bank—which
does have precedential effect. Although the en banc
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court reached the proper judgment that the claims at
issue in CLS Bank were not patent eligible, the role of
a general-purpose computer in implementing the
computerized trading program for reducing settlement
risk was if anything more detailed than the role of a
general purpose computer under the claims at issue
here. Indeed, whereas the claim analyzed in this case
simply refers to “an Internet website,” the claims in
CLS Bank were much more detailed and computer
grounded. They referred to an “electronic adjustment”
limitation, which the parties “agreed ‘requir[es] the use
of a computer,’” and limitations involving shadow
credit and debit records, which also require computer
implementation.
685 F.3d at 1354 (alteration in
original). The specifications provide further detail
about the computer implementation because they
disclose a detailed description of “a system called
‘INVENTICO’” and a “CONTRACT APP.” Id.
Moreover, because CLS Bank did not produce a
precedential rationale for the court, the conflict
between this case and the Federal Circuit’s pre-CLS
Bank cases also remains. See, e.g., Bancorp Servs.,
LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (USA), 687
F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he use of a
computer in an otherwise patent ineligible process for
no more than its most basic function—making
calculations or computations—fails to circumvent the
prohibition against patenting abstract ideas and mental
processes.”); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions,
Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he basic
character of a process claim drawn to an abstract idea
is not changed by claiming only its performance by
computers . . . .”); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d
1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Simply adding a ‘computer
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aided’ limitation to a claim covering an abstract
concept, without more, is insufficient to render the
claim patent eligible.”). Only this Court can resolve the
intractable conflict in the Federal Circuit.
III.

THIS
COURT’S
GUIDANCE
IS
URGENTLY
NEEDED
ON
THE
IMPORTANT QUESTION PRESENTED

This Court’s guidance is urgently needed on the
patentability of computer-implemented methods.
Thousands of patents apply to some aspect of the
Internet. Indeed, one source estimated that 11,000
patents apply just to selling, shipping, or advertising
products online. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer,
Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and
Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 9-9 (2008). This case
involves a business method implemented “at an
Internet website,” but the Federal Circuit’s broad
reasoning also may impact software and other
technological patents. Scholars have estimated that
20,000 software patents are granted each year. See
James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look
at Software Patents, 16 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 157,
158 (2007). And the software industry is one of the
critical drivers and fastest growing components of our
Nation’s economy. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Do
Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software
Industry?, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 961, 963 (2005). Moreover,
as this case illustrates, “[m]any software and business
method patents simply describe a basic, well-known
concept that has been implemented or applied using
conventional computer technology.” MySpace, 672
F.3d at 1267 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
The Federal Circuit’s intractable internal conflict
over § 101 has thrown this entire category of patents
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into a state of intolerable uncertainty. Indeed, even
before the dust up in CLS Bank, commentators
described the case law on the patent eligibility of
computer-related inventions as “extraordinarily
unclear”—a “rule-less wasteland of post-Bilski
jurisprudence” that “is excruciatingly difficult to
maneuver.” Robert D. Swanson, Note: Section 101 and
Computer-Implemented Inventions, 16 Stan. Tech. L.
Rev. 161, 162, 184 (2012). The “nightmare” of fractured
opinions in CLS Bank did not resolve the issue. 6 And
the decision below added to the conflict. According to
commentators, the Federal Circuit’s broad ruling in
this case “set[s] the stage for rampant patent litigation
to continue unchecked” and continues to evidence “‘two
Federal Circuits on this issue,’” furthering a “kind of
legal uncertainty [that] can’t last forever.” 7 Moreover,
the Federal Circuit’s broad ruling “set[s] up a conflict”
with this Court’s decisions and “could be seen as a
show of defiance” after this Court’s GVR order. 8
The current uncertainty makes investments riskier
and stifles innovation in the technology sector. As
6 Gene Quinn, Federal Circuit Nightmare in CLS Bank v.

Alice
Corp.,
IPWatchdog
(May
10,
2013),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/05/10/federal-circuit-nightmarein-cls-bank-v-alice-corp/id=40230/.
7 Timothy B. Lee, One of the worst patents ever just got upheld
in court, Washington Post, Wonkblog, (June 24, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/24/on
e-of-the-worst-patents-ever-just-got-upheld-in-court/
(citation
omitted).
8 Daniel

Fisher, Take That, SCOTUS: Appeals Court
Reinstates Patent On Video-Ad Technology, Forbes (June 21,
2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/06/21/takethat-scotus-appeals-court-reinstates-patent-on-video-adtechnology/.
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Judge Newman explained, “the uncertainty of
administrative and judicial outcome and the high cost
of resolution are a disincentive to both innovators and
competitors.” CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1321 (concurring
in part, dissenting in part). Litigation costs are already
high—according to studies, “software and business
method patents account for nearly forty percent of the
total cost of patent litigation and the problem is getting
worse.” Gerard N. Magliocca, Patenting the Curve
Ball: Business Methods and Industry Norms, 2009
BYU L. Rev. 875, 887 (2009). Indeed, the cost of
litigation for software and information technology
patents often exceeds the profits of the patents. See
Bessen & Meurer, supra, at 15-16, 144.
Section 101 “is virtually the only defensive
mechanism left for repeat victims of software patent
holdup.” Brian J. Love, Why Patentable Subject
Matter Matters for Software, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
Arguendo 1, 3 (2012). Patent infringement litigation
“defense costs are extremely high,” so plaintiffs “can
often negotiate sizeable settlements” simply because
the price is lower than the cost of discovery or
defending a trial. Id. at 10. The current legal
uncertainty and the effective elimination of § 101 as a
screening device makes it easier for plaintiffs to
extract unwarranted settlements. And as the number
of cases decided by the Federal Circuit in just the past
few years illustrates, the question whether computerimplemented methods are patentable arises frequently.
As amici Google Inc. and Verizon Communications
Inc. noted previously, this case “is an unusually clean
vehicle” in which to address this issue and provide
needed guidance. Google Amicus Br. 13 (No. 11-962).
The concept of trading advertisement viewing for
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content is indisputably abstract. App. 28a. The court
below recognized that formal claim construction was
not necessary before resolving the § 101 issue
presented here. Id. at 29a-30a, 38a. The claims at issue
are based on technology that is easily understood—
indeed, virtually any Internet user is familiar with
websites that require viewing advertisements before
viewing content.
This case not only presents a
computer-related method but one that applies to the
Internet, a growing body of method patents. Supra at
31. And the Federal Circuit’s decision in this case
holding that the claims at issue are patent eligible
under § 101 is written in sweeping terms and will all
but eliminate the important role of § 101 in screening
computer- and Internet-related patents.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of
certiorari should be granted.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
ULTRAMERCIAL, INC. AND
ULTRAMERCIAL, LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
HULU, LLC, Defendant, AND WILDTANGENT,
INC., Defendant-Appellee.
2010-1544
June 21, 2013, Decided
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 12715
Before RADER, Chief Judge, LOURIE and
O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the court
filed by Chief Judge RADER. Concurring opinion filed
by Circuit Judge LOURIE.
OPINION
RADER, Chief Judge.
The United States District Court for the Central
District of California dismissed this patent suit, filed by
Ultramercial, LLC and Ultramercial, Inc. (collectively,
“Ultramercial”), by holding that U.S. Patent No.
7,346,545 (“the ’545 patent”) does not claim patenteligible subject matter. In an earlier decision, later
vacated by the United States Supreme Court, this
court reversed the district court’s holding and
remanded. Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. WildTangent,
Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S.Ct. 2431, 182 L. Ed. 2d
1059 (2012). Because this court again holds that the
district court erred in holding that the subject matter
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of the ’545 patent is not a “process” within the language
and meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101, this court again
reverses and remands.
I.
The ’545 patent claims a method for distributing
copyrighted products (e.g., songs, movies, books) over
the Internet where the consumer receives a
copyrighted product for free in exchange for viewing
an advertisement, and the advertiser pays for the
copyrighted content. Claim 1 of the ’545 patent reads:
A method for distribution of products over the
Internet via a facilitator, said method comprising
the steps of:
a first step of receiving, from a content
provider, media products that are covered
by intellectual property rights protection
and are available for purchase, wherein
each said media product being comprised of
at least one of text data, music data, and
video data;
a second step of selecting a sponsor
message to be associated with the media
product, said sponsor message being
selected from a plurality of sponsor
messages, said second step including
accessing an activity log to verify that the
total number of times which the sponsor
message has been previously presented is
less than the number of transaction cycles
contracted by the sponsor of the sponsor
message;
a third step of providing the media
product for sale at an Internet website;
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a fourth step of restricting general public
access to said media product;
a fifth step of offering to a consumer
access to the media product without charge
to the consumer on the precondition that
the consumer views the sponsor message;
a sixth step of receiving from the
consumer a request to view the sponsor
message, wherein the consumer submits
said request in response to being offered
access to the media product;
a seventh step of, in response to
receiving the request from the consumer,
facilitating the display of a sponsor
message to the consumer;
an eighth step of, if the sponsor message
is not an interactive message, allowing said
consumer access to said media product
after said step of facilitating the display of
said sponsor message;
a ninth step of, if the sponsor message is
an interactive message, presenting at least
one query to the consumer and allowing
said consumer access to said media product
after receiving a response to said at least
one query;
a tenth step of recording the transaction
event to the activity log, said tenth step
including updating the total number of
times the sponsor message has been
presented; and
an eleventh step of receiving payment
from the sponsor of the sponsor message
displayed.
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’545 patent col. 8, ll. 5-48.
Ultramercial sued Hulu, LLC (“Hulu”), YouTube,
LLC
(“YouTube”),
and
WildTangent,
Inc.
(“WildTangent”), alleging infringement of the ’545
patent. Hulu and YouTube have been dismissed from
the case. WildTangent moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, arguing that the ’545 patent did not claim
patent-eligible subject matter. The district court
granted WildTangent’s pre-answer motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6). Ultramercial appeals. This court
has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
This court reviews a district court’s dismissal for
failure to state a claim under the law of the regional
circuit. Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Shipley, 643 F.3d
1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The
Ninth Circuit reviews de novo challenges to a dismissal
for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith
Barney, Inc., 403 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2005). This
court also reviews the ultimate determination
regarding patent-eligible subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101 without deference. In re Ferguson, 558
F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
II.
The district court dismissed Ultramercial’s claims
for failure to claim statutory subject matter without
formally construing the claims and, further, without
requiring defendants to file answers. This raises
several preliminary issues.
First, it will be rare that a patent infringement suit
can be dismissed at the pleading stage for lack of
patentable subject matter. This is so because every
issued patent is presumed to have been issued
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properly, absent clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. See, e.g., CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp.,
F.3d
, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9493, 2013 WL
1920941, *33 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) (Chief Judge
Rader, and Judges Linn, Moore, and O’Malley,
concluding that “any attack on an issued patent based
on a challenge to the eligibility of the subject matter
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence,” and
Judges Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, and Wallach,
concluding that a statutory presumption of validity
applies when § 101 is raised as a basis for invalidity in
district court proceedings.). Further, if Rule 12(b)(6) is
used to assert an affirmative defense, dismissal is
appropriate only if the well-pleaded factual allegations
in the complaint, construed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, suffice to establish the defense. See
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127
S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007); Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 215, 127 S. Ct. 910, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2007).
Thus, the only plausible reading of the patent must be
that there is clear and convincing evidence of
ineligibility. For those reasons, Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
for lack of eligible subject matter will be the exception,
not the rule.
Second, as is shown more fully below, the analysis
under § 101, while ultimately a legal determination, is
rife with underlying factual issues. For example, while
members of this court have used varying formulations
for the precise test, there is no doubt the § 101 inquiry
requires a search for limitations in the claims that
narrow or tie the claims to specific applications of an
otherwise abstract concept. CLS Bank,
F.3d
,
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9493, 2013 WL 1920941 at *2730 (meaningful limitations); 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS
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9493, [WL] at *10 (opinion of Lourie, J.). Further,
factual issues may underlie determining whether the
patent embraces a scientific principle or abstract idea.
Id. (opinion of Lourie, J.) (“The underlying notion is
that a scientific principle ... reveals a relationship that
has always existed.”) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 593 n.15, 98 S. Ct. 2522, 57 L. Ed. 2d 451
(1978)). If the question is whether “genuine human
contribution” is required, and that requires “more than
a trivial appendix to the underlying abstract idea,” and
were not at the time of filing “routine, well-understood,
or conventional,” factual inquiries likely abound. 2013
U.S. App. LEXIS 9493, [WL] at *11–12. Almost by
definition, analyzing whether something was
“conventional” or “routine” involves analyzing facts.
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9493, [WL] at *12. Likewise,
any inquiry into the scope of preemption—how much of
the field is “tied up” by the claim—by definition will
involve historic facts: identifying the “field,” the
available alternatives, and preemptive impact of the
claims in that field. The presence of factual issues
coupled with the requirement for clear and convincing
evidence normally will render dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) improper.
Third, and in part because of the factual issues
involved, claim construction normally will be required.
This court has never set forth a bright line rule
requiring district courts to construe claims before
determining subject matter eligibility. Indeed, because
eligibility is a “coarse” gauge of the suitability of broad
subject matter categories for patent protection,
Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627
F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010), claim construction may
not always be necessary for a § 101 analysis. See, e.g.,
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Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231, 177 L. Ed. 2d
792 (2010) (finding subject matter ineligible for patent
protection without claim construction); CLS Bank,
F.3d
, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9493, 2013 WL
1920941 (court decided eligibility of subject matter
without formal claim construction).
On the other hand, if there are factual disputes,
claim construction should be required. The procedural
posture of the case may indicate whether claim
construction is required. This case involves Rule
12(b)(6), which requires courts to accept the wellpleaded factual allegations as true and to require the
accused infringer to establish that the only plausible
reading of the claims is that, by clear and convincing
evidence, they cover ineligible subject matter. It may
also be feasible for the district court to choose to
construe the claims in accordance with this court’s
precedent, or to adopt the construction proffered by
the patentee. In either case, it cannot decide factual
questions at this stage. At summary judgment, the
district court may choose to construe the claims in
accordance with this court’s precedent, or if not it may
choose to give a construction most favorable to the
patentee, and to apply the usual rules pertaining to
summary judgment from there, and still require clear
and convincing evidence of ineligible subject matter.
Of course, even if not required, on many occasions a
definition of the invention by claim construction can
clarify the basic character of the subject matter of the
invention. Thus, claim meaning may clarify the actual
subject matter at stake in the invention and can
enlighten, or even answer, questions about subject
matter abstractness.
In this procedural posture,
however, the subject matter at stake and its eligibility

8a
does not require formal claim construction.
Finally, fourth, the question of eligible subject
matter must be determined on a claim-by-claim basis.
Construing every asserted claim and then conducting a
§ 101 analysis may not be a wise use of judicial
resources.
With these thoughts in mind, the court turns to the
question of whether the court correctly dismissed the
suit under § 101.
III.
A.
The statute controls the inquiry into patentable
subject matter.
35 U.S.C. § 101 sets forth the
categories of subject matter that are eligible for patent
protection: “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” (Emphasis added). Underscoring its breadth,
§ 101 both uses expansive categories and modifies them
with the word “any.” In Bilski, the Supreme Court
emphasized that “[i]n choosing such expansive terms
modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly
contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide
scope.” 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (quoting Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308, 100 S. Ct. 2204, 65 L.
Ed. 2d 144 (1980)).
The pertinent, expansive definition of “process” in
§ 100(b) confirms the statute’s intended breadth. At
first examination, the Act’s definition of “process” to
include a new use of a known machine seems
superfluous.
After all, if “any” process may be
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patented under § 101, § 100(b) seems wholly
unnecessary. The amendment was necessary to avoid
narrow judicial interpretations of “process” given to
the pre-1952 statute.
Specifically, the 1952
amendments added § 100(b) to ensure that doubts
about the scope of a “process” under the pre-1952
version of the patent statute would not be read into the
new Act. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New
Patent Act, reprinted in 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off.
Soc’y 161, 177 (1993) (“Remarks have appeared in a few
decisions and elsewhere that new uses are not
patentable .... [I]f such remarks are interpreted to
mean that a new use or application of an old machine ...
cannot result in anything patentable then such
statements are not and have never been an accurate
statement of the law.”); Hearing Before Sub-comm. No.
3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, at 37 (1951) (Federico
testifying that the “definition of ‘process’ has been
added ... to clarify the present law as to certain types of
methods as to which some doubts have been expressed
....”); S.Rep. No. 82–1979, at 17 (1952) (Explaining that
the definition clarified that “processes or methods
which involve merely the new use of a known process ...
are processes or methods under the statute and may be
patented provided the conditions of patentability are
satisfied.”). Thus, changes were made to the 1952 Act
to broaden eligible subject matter and eliminate doubt
caused by narrow interpretations given to the prior
statute. Moreover, not only did Congress expand the
definition of “process” in 1952, Title 35 does not list a
single ineligible category. At a time when Congress
considered § 101, it broadened the statute and certainly
did not place any specific limits on it.
The limited role of § 101 even in patentability (the
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patentee did not argue that § 101 is not a defense to
infringement) is confirmed by other aspects of the
Patent Act. As § 101 itself expresses, subject matter
eligibility is merely a threshold check; patentability of a
claim ultimately depends on “the conditions and
requirements of this title,” such as novelty, nonobviousness, and adequate disclosure. 35 U.S.C. § 101;
see Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3225 (Characterizing § 101 as a
“threshold test”); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v.
Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057,1064 (Fed. Cir.2011)
(Pointing out the difference between “the threshold
inquiry of patent-eligibility, and the substantive
conditions of patentability”). By directing attention to
the substantive criteria for patentability, Congress
made it clear that the categories of patent-eligible
subject matter are no more than a “coarse eligibility
filter.” Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 869. In other
words, Congress made it clear that the expansive
categories—process, machine, article of manufacture,
and composition of matter—are not substitutes for the
substantive patentability requirements set forth in
§§ 102, 103, and 112 and invoked expressly by § 101
itself. After all, the purpose of the Patent Act is to
encourage innovation, and the use of broadly inclusive
categories of statutory subject matter ensures that
“ingenuity ... receive[s] a liberal encouragement.”
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308. The plain language of
the statute provides that any new, non-obvious, and
fully disclosed technical advance is eligible for
protection.
B.
The Supreme Court has on occasion recognized
narrow judicial exceptions to the 1952 Act’s
deliberately broadened eligibility provisions. In line
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with the broadly permissive nature of § 101’s subject
matter eligibility principles and the structure of the
Patent Act, case law has recognized only three narrow
categories of subject matter outside the eligibility
bounds of § 101—laws of nature, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225. The
Court’s motivation for recognizing exceptions to this
broad statutory grant was its desire to prevent the
“monopolization” of the “basic tools of scientific and
technological work,” which “might tend to impede
innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293, 182 L. Ed. 2d 321 (2012)
(“Prometheus ”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Though recognizing these exceptions, the Court has
also recognized that these implied exceptions are in
obvious tension with the plain language of the statute,
its history, and its purpose. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
at 308 (“In choosing such expansive terms as
‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified by
the
comprehensive
‘any,’
Congress
plainly
contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide
scope.”); id. at 315 (“Broad general language is not
necessarily ambiguous when congressional objectives
require broad terms.”). As the Supreme Court has
made clear, too broad an interpretation of these
exclusions from the grant in § 101 “could eviscerate
patent law.” Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1293; cf. Bilski,
130 S. Ct. at 3226 (“This Court has not indicated that
the existence of these well-established exceptions gives
the Judiciary carte blanche to impose other limitations
that are inconsistent with the text and the statute’s
purpose and design.”).
Thus, this court must not read § 101 so restrictively
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as to exclude “unanticipated inventions” because the
most beneficial inventions are “often unforeseeable.”
See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 316; see also J.E.M. Ag
Supply, 534 U.S. at 135 (describing § 101 as “a dynamic
provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen
inventions.”). Broad inclusivity is the Congressional
goal of § 101, not a flaw.
To sum up, because eligibility requires assessing
judicially recognized exceptions against a broad and
deliberately expanded statutory grant, one of the
principles that must guide our inquiry is these
exceptions should apply narrowly.
Indeed, the
Supreme Court has cautioned that, to avoid improper
restraints on statutory language, acknowledged
exceptions thereto must be rare.
C.
In the eligibility analysis as well, the presumption
of proper issuance applies to a granted patent. As a
practical matter, because judicially acknowledged
exceptions could eviscerate the statute, application of
this presumption and its attendant evidentiary burden
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s admonition to
cabin exceptions to § 101. Further, applying the
presumption is consistent with patent office practice.
Before issuing a patent, the Patent Office rejects
claims if they are drawn to ineligible subject matter,
just as it rejects claims if not compliant with §§ 102,
103, or 112. With one exception, the Supreme Court’s
decisions since 1952 have addressed the propriety of
those decisions. Thus, when a patent issues, it does so
after the Patent Office assesses and endorses its
eligibility under § 101, just as it assesses and endorses
its patentability under the other provisions of Title 35.
See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S.Ct. 2238,
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2242, 180 L.Ed.2d 131, (2011) (“Congress has set forth
the prerequisites for issuance of a patent, which the
PTO must evaluate in the examination process. To
receive patent protection a claimed invention must,
among other things, fall within one of the express
categories of patentable subject matter, § 101, and be
novel, § 102, and nonobvious, § 103.”).
In sum, the high level of proof applies to eligibility
as it does to the separate patentability determinations.
Accordingly, any attack on an issued patent based on a
challenge to the eligibility of the subject matter must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Cf.
Microsoft, 31 S. Ct. at 2242 (“We consider whether
§ 282 requires an invalidity defense to be proved by
clear and convincing evidence. We hold that it does.”).
IV.
A.
Defining “abstractness” has presented difficult
problems, particularly for the § 101 “process” category.
Clearly, a process need not use a computer, or some
machine, in order to avoid “abstractness.” In this
regard, the Supreme Court recently examined the
statute and found that the ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning of “method” may include even
methods of doing business. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at
3228. Accordingly, the Court refused to deem business
methods ineligible for patent protection and cautioned
against “read[ing] into the patent laws limitations and
conditions which the legislature has not expressed.”
Id. at 3226 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
182, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1981)).
In an effort to grapple with this non-statutory
“abstractness” exception to “processes,” the dictionary
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provides some help. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 5 (11th ed. 2003) (defining abstract as
“disassociated from any specific instance ... expressing
a quality apart from an object <the word poem is
concrete, poetry is [abstract]>”). An abstract idea is
one that has no reference to material objects or specific
examples—i.e., it is not concrete. This court at one
point set forth a machine-or-transformation test as the
exclusive metric for determining the subject matter
eligibility of processes. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956
(Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d on other grounds, Bilski, 130 S.
Ct. 3218, 177 L. Ed. 2d 792. The Supreme Court
rejected this approach in Bilski, noting that the
machine-or-transformation test is simply “a useful and
important clue, an investigative tool, for determining
whether some claimed inventions are processes under
§ 101” and is not “the sole test for deciding whether an
invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’ ” 130 S. Ct. at
3227 (emphasis added).
While machine-ortransformation logic served well as a tool to evaluate
the subject matter of Industrial Age processes, that
test has far less application to the inventions of the
Information Age. See id. at 3227-28 (“[I]n deciding
whether previously unforeseen inventions qualify as
patentable ‘processes,’ it may not make sense to
require courts to confine themselves to asking the
questions posed by the machine-or-transformation test.
§ 101’s terms suggest that new technologies may call
for new inquiries.”). Technology without anchors in
physical structures and mechanical steps simply defy
easy
classification
under
the
machine-ortransformation categories. As the Supreme Court
suggests, mechanically applying that physical test
“risk[s] obscuring the larger object of securing patents
for valuable inventions without transgressing the
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public domain.” Id. at 3227.
Members of both the Supreme Court and this court
have recognized the difficulty of providing a precise
formula or definition for the abstract concept of
abstractness. See id. at 3236 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“The Court ... [has] never provide[d] a satisfying
account of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract
idea.”); Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 868. Because
technology is ever-changing and evolves in
unforeseeable ways, this court gives substantial weight
to the statutory reluctance to list any new, nonobvious, and fully disclosed subject matter as beyond
the reach of Title 35.
B.
A claim can embrace an abstract idea and be
patentable.
See Prometheus, 132 S.Ct. at 1294
(explaining that the fact that a claim uses a basic tool
does not mean it is not eligible for patenting). Instead,
a claim is not patent eligible only if, instead of claiming
an application of an abstract idea, the claim is instead
to the abstract idea itself. The inquiry here is to
determine on which side of the line the claim falls: does
the claim cover only an abstract idea, or instead does
the claim cover an application of an abstract idea? See
Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3230 (“[W]hile an abstract idea, law
of nature, or mathematical formula could not be
patented, an application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure or process
may well be deserving of patent protection.” (emphasis
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 93 S. Ct. 253, 34
L. Ed. 2d 273 (1972) (“He who discovers a hitherto
unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a
monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to
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be invention from such a discovery, it must come from
the application of the law of nature to a new and useful
end.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure or process
may well be deserving of patent protection.”)
In determining on which side of the line the claim
falls, the court must focus on the claim as a whole. As
the Court explained:
In determining the eligibility of respondents’
claimed process for patent protection under
§ 101, their claims must be considered as a
whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the claims
into old and new elements and then to ignore the
presence of the old elements in the analysis.
This is particularly true in a process claim
because a new combination of steps in a process
may be patentable even though all the
constituents of the combination were well known
and in common use before the combination was
made.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (emphasis added). The majority
in Diehr rejected the minority’s approach ignoring
portions of the claims: “[i]n order for the dissent to
reach its conclusion it is necessary for it to read out of
respondents’ patent application all the steps in the
claimed process which it determined were not novel or
‘inventive.’ That is not the purpose of the § 101 inquiry
....” Id. at 193 n. 15 (citations omitted); Aro Mfg. Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345, 81
S. Ct. 599, 5 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1961) (“[T]here is no legally
recognizable or protected ‘essential’ element, ‘gist’ or
‘heart’ of the invention.”).
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The Court has long-recognized that any claim can
be stripped down, simplified, generalized, or
paraphrased to remove all of its concrete limitations,
until at its core, something that could be characterized
as an abstract idea is revealed. A court cannot go
hunting for abstractions by ignoring the concrete,
palpable, tangible limitations of the invention the
patentee actually claims.
Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether a claim, as
a whole, includes meaningful limitations restricting it
to an application, rather than merely an abstract idea.
See Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1297 (“[D]o the patent
claims add enough to their statements of the
correlations to allow the processes they describe to
qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural
laws?”); see also Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease
LLC, 671 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]o impart
patent-eligibility to an otherwise unpatentable process
under the theory that the process is linked to a
machine, the use of the machine must impose
meaningful limits on the claim’s scope.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). For these reasons, a claim
may be premised on an abstract idea and, indeed, the
abstract idea may be of central importance to the
invention—the question for patent eligibility is
whether the claim contains limitations that
meaningfully tie that abstract idea to an actual
application of that idea through meaningful limitations.
This analysis is not easy, but potentially wrought
with the risk of subjectivity and hindsight evaluations.
It also, as noted at the outset, often entails factual
inquiries inappropriate on a motion directed to the
pleadings.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has
provided some guideposts.
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An old example may be the most informative. The
claims in O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 14 L.
Ed. 601 (1854), and a case described therein, illustrate
the distinction between a patent ineligible abstract idea
and a practical application of an idea. The “difficulty”
in Morse arose with the claim in which Morse:
d[id] not propose to limit [him]self to the
specific machinery or parts of machinery
described in the ... specification and claims; the
essence of [his] invention being the use of the
motive power of the electric or galvanic current
... however developed for marking or printing
intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any
distances ....
Id. at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted). In
considering Morse’s claim, the Supreme Court referred
to an earlier English case that distinguished ineligible
claims to a “principle” from claims “applying” that
principle:
[I]t seems that the court at first doubted,
whether it was a patent for anything more than
the discovery that hot air would promote the
ignition of fuel better than cold. And if this had
been the construction, the court, it appears,
would have held his patent to be void; because
the discovery of a principle in natural philosophy
or physical science, is not patentable.
But after much consideration, it was finally
decided that this principle must be regarded as
well known, and that the plaintiff had invented a
mechanical mode of applying it to furnaces; and
that his invention consisted in interposing a
heated receptacle, between the blower and the

19a
furnace, and by this means heating the air after
it left the blower, and before it was thrown into
the fire. Whoever, therefore, used this method
of throwing hot air into the furnace, used the
process he had invented, and thereby infringed
his patent, although the form of the receptacle or
the mechanical arrangements for heating it,
might be different from those described by the
patentee.
Id. at 116. The claim in Morse itself was impermissible
because it covered “ ‘an effect produced by the use of
electro-magnetism, distinct from the process or
machinery necessary to produce it.’ ” The Telephone
Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 534, 8 S. Ct. 778, 31 L. Ed. 863 (1888)
(quoting Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 120). This was in
contrast to a sustained claim that was limited to:
making use of the motive power of
magnetism, when developed by the action of
such current or currents, substantially as set
forth in the ... description, ... as means of
operating or giving motion to machinery, which
may be used to imprint signals upon paper or
other suitable material, or to produce sounds in
any desired manner, for the purpose of
telegraphic communication at any distances.
Id. (first ellipsis added, second ellipsis in original)
(quoting Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 85). “ ‘The effect
of [Morse ] was, therefore, that the use of magnetism
as a motive power, without regard to the particular
process with which it was connected in the patent,
could not be claimed, but that its use in that connection
could.’ ”
Benson, 409 U.S. at 68 (quoting The
Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. at 534).
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The concern underscoring Morse, which has become
clearer through the Supreme Court’s more recent
precedents, is to deny patentability to an idea itself,
rather than an application of that idea. The Court has
provided some guidance on discerning when this should
occur.
First, the Supreme Court has stated that a claim is
not meaningfully limited if it merely describes an
abstract idea or simply adds “apply it.”
See
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1297. The broad claim
in Morse provides a striking example of this. We also
know that, if a claim covers all practical applications of
an abstract idea, it is not meaningfully limited. See id.
at 1301-02. For example, “[a]llowing petitioners to
patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this
approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a
monopoly over an abstract idea.” Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at
3231 (emphasis added).
While this concept is
frequently referred to as “pre-emption,” it is important
to remember that all patents “pre-empt” some future
innovation in the sense that they preclude others from
commercializing the invention without the patentee’s
permission. Pre-emption is only a subject matter
eligibility problem when a claim pre-empts all practical
uses of an abstract idea. For example, the claims in
Benson “purported to cover any use of the claimed
method in a general-purpose digital computer of any
type.” 409 U.S. at 64 (emphasis added). The claims
were not allowed precisely because they pre-empted
essentially all uses of the idea:
It is conceded that one may not patent an
idea. But in practical effect that would be the
result if the formula for converting [binarycoded decimal] numerals to pure binary
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numerals were patented in this case. The
mathematical formula involved here has no
substantial practical application except in
connection with a digital computer, which means
that ... the patent would wholly pre-empt the
mathematical formula and in practical effect
would be a patent on the algorithm itself.
Id. at 71-72 (emphasis added). When the steps of the
claim “must be taken in order to apply the [abstract
idea] in question,” the claim is essentially no different
from saying apply the abstract idea. Prometheus, 132
S.Ct. at 1299-1300. It is not the breadth or narrowness
of the abstract idea that is relevant, but whether the
claim covers every practical application of that abstract
idea. 1 As noted at the outset, whether a claim
preempts “too much” will often require claim
construction and factual inquiries.
And, the Supreme Court has stated that, even if a
claim does not wholly pre-empt an abstract idea, it still
will not be limited meaningfully if it contains only
insignificant or token pre- or post-solution activity—
such as identifying a relevant audience, a category of

1 The pre-emption analysis must also recognize that the
Patent Act does not halt or impede academic research, without
commercial ends, to test, confirm, or improve a patented
invention.
See Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555
(C.C.D.Mass.1813) (No. 12,391) (Story, J.) (infringement does not
occur when the invention is used “for the mere purpose of
philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness
of the specification”). Further, Morse shows that a claim is not
“abstract” merely because it is broad, because the “hot air” claims
were broad and covered many “mechanical arrangements” but yet
found patent eligible.
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use, field of use, or technological environment. See
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1297-98, 1300-01; Bilski, 130
S. Ct. at 3230-31; Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-92 & n.14;
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 n.18, 98 S. Ct. 2522,
57 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1978). Again, these may involve
factual inquiries.
Finally, the Supreme Court has stated that a claim
is not meaningfully limited if its purported limitations
provide no real direction, cover all possible ways to
achieve the provided result, or are overly-generalized.
See Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1300 (“[S]imply
appending conventional steps, specified at a high level
of generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas cannot make those laws, phenomena,
and ideas patentable.”); Fort Props., 671 F.3d at 1323
(“Such a broad and general limitation does not impose
meaningful limits on the claim’s scope.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
For example, in
Prometheus, “the ‘determining’ step tells the doctor to
determine the level of the relevant metabolites in the
blood, through whatever process the doctor or the
laboratory wishes to use.” 132 S. Ct. at 1297. Diehr
explained that the application in Flook “did not purport
to explain how these other variables were to be
determined, nor did it purport to contain any disclosure
relating to the chemical processes at work, the
monitoring of process variables, or the means of setting
off an alarm or adjusting an alarm system,” and that
“[a]ll that it provides is a formula for computing an
updated alarm limit.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186-87
(footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Just as the Supreme Court has indicated when a
claim likely should not be deemed meaningfully limited,
it has also given examples of meaningful limitations
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which likely remove claims from the scope of the
Court’s judicially created exceptions to § 101. Thus, a
claim is meaningfully limited if it requires a particular
machine implementing a process or a particular
transformation of matter. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227
(“This Court’s precedents establish that the machineor-transformation test is a useful and important clue ...
for determining whether some claimed inventions are
processes under § 101.”); see also Prometheus, 132
S.Ct. at 1302-03; Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184, 192. A claim
also will be limited meaningfully when, in addition to
the abstract idea, the claim recites added limitations
which are essential to the invention.
In those
instances, the added limitations do more than recite
pre- or post-solution activity, they are central to the
solution itself. And, in such circumstances, the abstract
idea is not wholly pre-empted; it is only preempted
when practiced in conjunction with the other necessary
elements of the claimed invention. See Diehr, 450 U.S.
at 187 (“[T]he respondents here do not seek to patent a
mathematical formula. Instead, they seek patent
protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber.
Their process admittedly employs a well-known
mathematical equation, but they do not seek to preempt the use of that equation. Rather, they seek only
to foreclose from others the use of that equation in
conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed
process.”); see also Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1298-99
(discussing Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L.
Ed. 2d 155).
In specifying what the scope of the abstract idea
exception to patent eligibility is, it is also important to
specify what the analysis is not. Flook suggested that
an abstract idea is to be “treated as though it were a

24a
familiar part of the prior art.” 437 U.S. at 591-92.
Prometheus used the language of “inventive concept”
to describe the “other elements or a combination of
elements ... sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the natural law itself” and explain that purported
limitations must be more than “routine” or
“conventional” to confer patent eligibility. 132 S. Ct. at
1294, 1298-99. While these inquiries do require an
understanding of what existed in the ken of those
skilled in the art during the relevant time frame,
principles of patent eligibility must not be conflated
with those of validity, however.
The Supreme Court repeatedly has cautioned
against conflating the analysis of the conditions of
patentability in the Patent Act with inquiries into
patent eligibility. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 190 (“The
question therefore of whether a particular invention is
novel is wholly apart from whether the invention falls
into a category of statutory subject matter.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Prometheus, 132 S.
Ct. at 1304 (recognizing that “to shift the patenteligibility inquiry entirely to [§§ 102, 103, and 112] risks
creating significantly greater legal uncertainty, while
assuming that those sections can do work that they are
not equipped to do”). Because a new combination of old
steps is patentable, as is a new process using an old
machine or composition, subject matter eligibility must
exist even if it was obvious to use the old steps with
the new machine or composition. Otherwise the
eligibility analysis ignores the text of §§ 101 and 100(b),
and reads § 103 out of the Patent Act.
In this regard, the Supreme Court’s reference to
“inventiveness” in Prometheus can be read as
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shorthand for its inquiry into whether implementing
the abstract idea in the context of the claimed
invention inherently requires the recited steps. Thus,
in Prometheus, the Supreme Court recognized that the
additional steps were those that anyone wanting to use
the natural law would necessarily use.
See
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1298. If, to implement the
abstract concept, one must perform the additional step,
or the step is a routine and conventional aspect of the
abstract idea, then the step merely separately restates
an element of the abstract idea, and thus does not
further limit the abstract concept to a practical
application. Id. (“Anyone who wants to make use of
these laws must first administer a thiopurine drug and
measure the resulting metabolite concentrations, and
so the combination amounts to nothing significantly
more than an instruction to the doctor to apply the
applicable laws when treating their patients.”)
C.
There are also additional guideposts specific to
computer-implemented inventions. When assessing
computer implemented claims, while the mere
reference to a general purpose computer will not save a
method claim from being deemed too abstract to be
patent eligible, the fact that a claim is limited by a tie
to a computer is an important indication of patent
eligibility. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227. This tie to a
machine moves it farther away from a claim to the
abstract idea itself. Moreover, that same tie makes it
less likely that the claims will pre-empt all practical
applications of the idea.
This inquiry focuses on whether the claims tie the
otherwise abstract idea to a specific way of doing
something with a computer, or a specific computer for
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doing something; if so, they likely will be patent
eligible. On the other hand, claims directed to nothing
more than the idea of doing that thing on a computer
are likely to face larger problems. While no particular
type of limitation is necessary, meaningful limitations
may include the computer being part of the solution,
being integral to the performance of the method, or
containing an improvement in computer technology.
See SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d
1319, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that “a machine,”
a GPS receiver, was “integral to each of the claims at
issue” and “place[d] a meaningful limit on the scope of
the claims”). A special purpose computer, i.e., a new
machine, specially designed to implement a process
may be sufficient. See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544
(“Although many, or arguably even all, of the means
elements recited in claim 15 represent circuitry
elements that perform mathematical calculations,
which is essentially true of all digital electrical circuits,
the claimed invention as a whole is directed to a
combination of interrelated elements which combine to
form a machine for converting discrete waveform data
samples into anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity
data to be displayed on a display means. This is not a
disembodied mathematical concept which may be
characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a specific
machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible
result.” (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 1545 (“We
have held that such programming creates a new
machine, because a general purpose computer in effect
becomes a special purpose computer once it is
programmed to perform particular functions pursuant
to instructions from program software.”).
At bottom, with a claim tied to a computer in a
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specific way, such that the computer plays a
meaningful role in the performance of the claimed
invention, it is as a matter of fact not likely to pre-empt
virtually all uses of an underlying abstract idea, leaving
the invention patent eligible.
“[I]nventions with
specific applications or improvements to technologies
in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that
they override the statutory language and framework of
the Patent Act.” Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 869.
With this background, the court turns to the
asserted claims here.
VI.
The district court did not construe the claims in
accordance with this court’s precedent. Instead, it held
that there was no “reasonable construction” that would
“bring the patent within patentable subject matter.”
A. 6. The district court erred in requiring the patentee
to come forward with a construction that would show
the claims were eligible. That is presumed. In this
procedural posture, the district court should either
have construed the claims in accordance with
Markman, required the defendant to establish that the
only plausible construction was one that, by clear and
convincing evidence rendered the subject matter
ineligible (with no factual inquiries), or adopted a
construction most favorable to the patentee. For
purposes of this appeal, this court adopts the latter
approach. It may be that formal claim construction will
still be required to determine the merits of eligibility.
The district court held the asserted claim to be
ineligible because it is “abstract.” In this procedural
posture, the complaint and the patent must by
themselves show clear and convincing evidence that
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the claim is not directed to an application of an abstract
idea, but to a disembodied abstract idea itself. See
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; Parker, 437 U.S. at 591;
Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67. After all, unlike the
Copyright Act which divides ideas from expression, the
Patent Act covers and protects any new and useful
technical advance, including applied ideas.
The claimed invention is a method for monetizing
and distributing copyrighted products over the
Internet. As a method, it easily satisfies § 100’s
definition of “process” and thus falls within a § 101
category of patent-eligible subject matter. Thus, this
court focuses on whether the claim is meaningfully
limited to something less than an abstract idea that
pre-empts use of an abstract concept.
The parties proceed on the assumption that the
mere idea that advertising can be used as a form of
currency is abstract, just as the vague, unapplied
concept of hedging proved patent-ineligible in Bilski.
However, the ’545 patent does not simply claim the
age-old idea that advertising can serve as currency.
Instead, for the following reasons, the court holds that
the district court erred in holding that the ’545 patent
does not claim a practical application of this concept. 2

2 When assessing the abstract idea exception, the § 101
inquiry is a two-step one: first, whether the claim involves an
intangible abstract idea; and if so, whether meaningful limitations
in the claim make it clear that the claim is not to the abstract idea
itself, but to a nonroutine and specific application of that idea.
Because the parties here focus only on the second step, we do as
well. We note, however, that it is arguable that we are not even
dealing with an intangible abstraction in the first instance; the
claims relate to things that people do, not to mere mental steps.
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The ’545 patent seeks to remedy problems with
prior art banner advertising over the Internet, such as
declining click-through rates, by introducing a method
of product distribution that forces consumers to view
and possibly even interact with advertisements before
permitting access to the desired media product. ’545
patent col. 2, ll.14-18. By its terms, the claimed
invention purports to improve existing technology in
the marketplace. By its terms, the claimed invention
invokes computers and applications of computer
technology.
Specifically, the ’545 patent claims a particular
internet and computer-based method for monetizing
copyrighted products, consisting of the following steps:
(1) receiving media products from a copyright holder,
(2) selecting an advertisement to be associated with
each media product, (3) providing said media products
for sale on an Internet website, (4) restricting general
public access to the media products, (5) offering free
access to said media products on the condition that the
consumer view the advertising, (6) receiving a request
from a consumer to view the advertising, (7) facilitating
the display of advertising and any required interaction
with the advertising, (8) allowing the consumer access
to the associated media product after such display and
interaction, if any, (9) recording this transaction in an
activity log, and (10) receiving payment from the
advertiser. ’545 patent col. 8, ll. 5-48. This court does
not need the record of a formal claim construction to
see that many of these steps require intricate and
Because the district court did not enter judgment on that ground
and the parties do not brief it, we decline to address this
alternative ground upon which this matter might be resolved.
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complex computer programming.
Even at this general level, it wrenches meaning
from the word to label the claimed invention
“abstract.” The claim does not cover the use of
advertising as currency disassociated with any specific
application of that activity. It was error for the district
court to strip away these limitations and instead
imagine some “core” of the invention. A. 6.
Further, and even without formal claim
construction, it is clear that several steps plainly
require that the method be performed through
computers, on the internet, and in a cyber-market
environment. One clear example is the third step,
“providing said media products for sale on an Internet
website.” Id. col. 8, ll. 20-21. And, of course, if the
products are offered for sale on the Internet, they must
be “restricted”—step four—by complex computer
programming as well.
In addition, Figure 1, alone, demonstrates that the
claim is not to some disembodied abstract idea but is
instead a specific application of a method implemented
by several computer systems, operating in tandem,
over a communications network:
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Almost all of the steps in this process, as explained
in the flow chart of Figure 2, are tied to computer
implementation:
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Viewing the subject matter as a whole, the
invention involves an extensive computer interface.
Unlike Morse, the claims are not made without regard
to a particular process. Likewise, it does not say “sell
advertising using a computer,” and so there is no risk
of preempting all forms of advertising, let alone
advertising on the Internet. Further, the record at this
stage shows no evidence that the recited steps are all
token pre- or post-solution steps. Finally, the claim
appears far from over generalized, with eleven
separate and specific steps with many limitations and
sub-steps in each category.
The district court
improperly made a subjective evaluation that these
limitations did not meaningfully limit the “abstract idea
at the core” of the claims. A. 6.
Having said that, this court does not define the
level of programming complexity required before a
computer-implemented method can be patent-eligible.
Nor does this court hold that use of an Internet
website to practice such a method is either necessary
or sufficient in every case to satisfy § 101. This court
simply holds the claims in this case to be patenteligible, in this posture, in part because of these
factors.
In this context, this court examines as well the
contention that the software programming necessary
to facilitate the invention deserves no patent protection
or amounts to abstract subject matter or, in the
confusing terminology of machines and physical
transformations, fails to satisfy the “particular
machine” requirement. This court confronted that
contention nearly two decades ago in In re Alappat, 33
F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir.1994) (en banc). At that time, this
court observed that “programming creates a new
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machine, because a general purpose computer in effect
becomes a special purpose computer once it is
programmed to perform particular functions pursuant
to instructions from program software.” Id. at 1545.
As computer scientists understand:
[T]he inventor can describe the invention in
terms of a dedicated circuit or a process that
emulates that circuit.
Indeed, the line of
demarcation between a dedicated circuit and a
computer algorithm accomplishing the identical
task is frequently blurred and is becoming
increasingly so as the technology develops. In
this field, a software process is often
interchangeable with a hardware circuit.
Id. at 1583 (Rader, J., concurring). In other words, a
programmed computer contains circuitry unique to
that computer. That “new machine” could be claimed
in terms of a complex array of hardware circuits, or
more efficiently, in terms of the programming that
facilitates a unique function.
With the digital
computer, considered by some the greatest invention of
the twentieth century, as a vital invention, both this
court and the Patent Office have long acknowledged
that “improvements thereof” through interchangeable
software or hardware enhancements deserve patent
protection. Far from abstract, advances in computer
technology—both hardware and software—drive
innovation in every area of scientific and technical
endeavor.
The court also notes that the claims in this case are
not highly generalized. Instead, the ten specific steps in
the claim limit any abstract concept within the scope of
the invention.
Further, common sense alone
establishes that these steps are not inherent in the idea
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of monetizing advertising. There are myriad ways to
accomplish that abstract concept that do not infringe
these claims.
This court understands that the broadly claimed
method in the ’545 patent does not specify a particular
mechanism for delivering media content to the
consumer (i.e., FTP downloads, email, or real-time
streaming). This breadth and lack of specificity does
not render the claimed subject matter impermissibly
abstract. Assuming the patent provides sufficient
disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art
to practice the invention and to satisfy the written
description requirement, the disclosure need not detail
the particular instrumentalities for each step in the
process.
That a process may be patentable,
irrespective of the particular form of the
instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed. If
one of the steps of a process be that a certain
substance is to be reduced to a powder, it may
not be at all material what instrument or
machinery is used to effect that object, whether
a hammer, a pestle and mortar, or a mill.
Benson, 409 U.S. at 69-70 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener,
94 U.S. 780, 787-88, 24 L. Ed. 139, 1877 Dec. Comm’r
Pat. 242 (1876)). Moreover, written description and
enablement are conditions for patentability that Title
35 sets “wholly apart from whether the invention falls
into a category of statutory subject matter.” Diehr,
450 U.S. at 190 (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961
(C.C.P.A. 1979)). The “coarse eligibility filter” of § 101
is not the statutory tool to address concerns about
vagueness, indefinite disclosure, or lack of enablement,
as these infirmities are expressly addressed by § 112.
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See 35 U.S.C. § 112; see also Research Corp., 627 F.3d
at 869 (“In § 112, the Patent Act provides powerful
tools to weed out claims that may present a vague or
indefinite disclosure of the invention.”).
Finally, the ’545 patent does not claim a
mathematical algorithm, a series of purely mental
steps, or any similarly abstract concept. It claims a
particular method for collecting revenue from the
distribution of media products over the Internet. In a
recent case, this court discerned that an invention
claimed
an
“unpatentable
mental
process.”
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d
1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Unlike the claims in
CyberSource, the claims here require, among other
things, controlled interaction with a consumer over an
Internet website, something far removed from purely
mental steps.
In sum, as a practical application of the general
concept of advertising as currency and an improvement
to prior art technology, the claimed invention is not “so
manifestly abstract as to override the statutory
language of section 101.” Research Corp., 627 F.3d at
869. Accordingly, this court reverses the district
court’s dismissal of Ultramercial’s patent claims for
lack of subject matter eligibility and remands for
further proceedings. This decision does not opine at all
on the patentability of the claimed invention under the
substantive criteria set forth in §§ 102, 103, and 112.
R EVERSED AND REMANDED
CONCUR BY: LOURIE
LOURIE, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I
write separately because I believe that we should
concisely and faithfully follow the Supreme Court’s
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most recent guidance regarding patent eligibility in
Mayo
Collaborative
Services
v.
Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 182 L. Ed. 2d 321
(2012), and should track the plurality opinion of five
judges from this court in CLS Bank International v.
Alice Corp.,
F.3d , 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9493,
2013 WL 1920941, at *1-20 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013)
(Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, & Wallach, JJ., plurality
opinion). It is our obligation to attempt to follow the
Supreme Court’s guidance in Mayo rather than to set
forth our own independent views, however valid we
may consider them to be. Indeed, this appeal was
specifically vacated by the Supreme Court and
remanded for further consideration in light of Mayo.
WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S.Ct.
2431, 182 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2012).
The claims at issue in this appeal are method claims,
not machine claims, and both Mayo and CLS Bank
dealt squarely with the issue of patent eligibility of
method claims. The plurality opinion in CLS Bank
identified a two-step process, derived from Mayo, for
analyzing patent eligibility under § 101. First, a court
must identify “whether the claimed invention fits
within one of the four statutory classes set out in
§ 101.” CLS Bank, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9493, 2013
WL 1920941, at *9. Second, one must assess whether
any of the judicial exceptions to subject-matter
eligibility apply, including whether the claims are to
patent-ineligible abstract ideas. Id.
In the case of abstractness, as discussed in CLS
Bank, we must determine whether the claim poses
“any risk of preempting an abstract idea.” Id. To do so
we must first “identify and define whatever
fundamental concept appears wrapped up in the claim”;
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a claim construction may be helpful in this analysis. Id.
Then, proceeding with the preemption analysis, the
balance of the claim is evaluated to determine whether
“additional substantive limitations ... narrow, confine,
or otherwise tie down the claim so that, in practical
terms, it does not cover the full abstract idea itself.”
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9493, [WL] at *10 (citing Mayo,
132 S.Ct. at 1300; Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218,
3231, 177 L. Ed. 2d 792 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 187, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1981)).
Following this procedure, we are then ready to
evaluate the claims at issue in this case.
I agree with the majority that no formal claim
construction is needed to interpret the claims at this
stage. See Majority Op. at 27. As the majority
correctly notes, the ’545 patent “claims a particular
method for collecting revenue from the distribution of
media products over the Internet” and, as a process,
“falls within a category of patent-eligible subject
matter.” Majority Op. at 25-26. The abstract idea at
the heart of the ’545 patent, which the district court
properly identified, is “us[ing] advertising as an
exchange or currency.” Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu,
LLC, No. CV 09-06918 RGK, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
93453, 2010 WL 3360098, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug.13, 2010).
The ’545 patent claims, however, require more than
just that abstract idea as part of the claimed method.
The additional claim limitations reciting how that
idea is implemented “narrow, confine, or otherwise tie
down the claim so that, in practical terms, it does not
cover the full abstract idea itself.” CLS Bank, 2013
U.S. App. LEXIS 9493, 2013 WL 1920941, at *10.
While a computer or complex computer program, as
discussed by the majority opinion, may be necessary to
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perform the method, it is not what the claim
specifically requires and thus should not be the focus of
the analysis. Likewise, although the number of claim
limitations is also not an indication of patent-eligibility,
unlike the method claims in CLS Bank, in my view, the
added limitations in these claims represent
significantly more than the underlying abstract idea of
using advertising as an exchange or currency and, as a
consequence, do not preempt the use of that idea in all
fields. See CLS Bank, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9493,
2013 WL 1920941, at *15. Thus, under the CLS Bank
plurality analysis, I agree with the majority that the
district court erred in dismissing Ultramercial’s claims
for lack of subject matter eligibility under § 101 due to
abstractness.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
ULTRAMERCIAL, LLC and Ultramercial, Inc.,
Plaintiffs–Appellants,
v.
HULU, LLC, Defendant,
and
WildTangent, Inc., Defendant–Appellee.
No. 2010-1544
Sept. 15, 2011.
657 F.3d 1323
Before RADER, Chief Judge, LOURIE and
O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.
RADER, Chief Judge.
The United States District Court for the Central
District of California dismissed Ultramercial, LLC and
Ultramercial, Inc.’s (collectively, “Ultramercial”)
patent infringement claims, finding that U.S. Patent
No. 7,346,545 (“the ’545 patent”) does not claim patenteligible subject matter. Because the ’545 patent claims
a “process” within the language and meaning of 35
U.S.C. § 101, this court reverses and remands.
I
The ’545 patent claims a method for distributing
copyrighted products (e.g., songs, movies, books) over
the Internet where the consumer receives a
copyrighted product for free in exchange for viewing
an advertisement, and the advertiser pays for the
copyrighted content. Claim 1 of the ’545 patent reads:
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A method for distribution of products over the
Internet via a facilitator, said method comprising
the steps of:
a first step of receiving, from a content provider,
media products that are covered by
intellectual property rights protection and are
available for purchase, wherein each said
media product being comprised of at least one
of text data, music data, and video data;
a second step of selecting a sponsor message to
be associated with the media product, said
sponsor message being selected from a
plurality of sponsor messages, said second
step including accessing an activity log to
verify that the total number of times which
the sponsor message has been previously
presented is less than the number of
transaction cycles contracted by the sponsor
of the sponsor message;
a third step of providing the media product for
sale at an Internet website;
a fourth step of restricting general public access
to said media product;
a fifth step of offering to a consumer access to
the media product without charge to the
consumer on the precondition that the
consumer views the sponsor message;
a sixth step of receiving from the consumer a
request to view the sponsor message, wherein
the consumer submits said request in
response to being offered access to the media
product;
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a seventh step of, in response to receiving the
request from the consumer, facilitating the
display of a sponsor message to the consumer;
an eighth step of, if the sponsor message is not
an interactive message, allowing said
consumer access to said media product after
said step of facilitating the display of said
sponsor message;
a ninth step of, if the sponsor message is an
interactive message, presenting at least one
query to the consumer and allowing said
consumer access to said media product after
receiving a response to said at least one
query;
a tenth step of recording the transaction event
to the activity log, said tenth step including
updating the total number of times the
sponsor message has been presented; and
an eleventh step of receiving payment from the
sponsor of the sponsor message displayed.
’545 patent col.8 ll.5–48.
Ultramercial filed suit against Hulu, LLC (“Hulu”),
YouTube, LLC (“YouTube”), and WildTangent, Inc.
(“WildTangent”), alleging infringement of the ’545
patent. Hulu and YouTube have been dismissed from
the case. WildTangent filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, arguing that the ’545 patent did
not claim patent-eligible subject matter. The district
court granted WildTangent’s motion to dismiss.
Ultramercial appeals. This court has jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
This court reviews a district court’s dismissal for
failure to state a claim without deference. Gillig v.
Nike, Inc., 602 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010). This
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court also reviews determinations regarding patenteligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 without
deference. In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1363
(Fed.Cir.2009).
II
The district court dismissed Ultramercial’s claims
for failure to claim statutory subject matter without
formally construing the claims. This court has never
set forth a bright line rule requiring district courts to
construe claims before determining subject matter
eligibility. Indeed, because eligibility is a “coarse”
gauge of the suitability of broad subject matter
categories for patent protection, Research Corp.
Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869
(Fed.Cir.2010), claim construction may not always be
necessary for a § 101 analysis. See, e.g., Bilski v.
Kappos, —U.S.—, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231, 177 L.Ed.2d
792 (2010) (finding subject matter ineligible for patent
protection without claim construction). On many
occasions, however, a definition of the invention via
claim construction can clarify the basic character of the
subject matter of the invention. Thus, claim meaning
may clarify the actual subject matter at stake in the
invention and can enlighten, or even answer, questions
about subject matter abstractness. In this case, the
subject matter at stake and its eligibility does not
require claim construction.
III
35 U.S.C. § 101 sets forth the categories of subject
matter that are eligible for patent protection:
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
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may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title” (emphasis added). In
Bilski, the Supreme Court explained that “[i]n
choosing such expansive terms modified by the
comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated
that the patent laws would be given wide scope.” 130
S. Ct. at 3225 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 308, 100 S.Ct. 2204, 65 L.Ed.2d 144 (1980)).
After all, the purpose of the Patent Act is to encourage
innovation, and the use of broadly inclusive categories
of statutory subject matter ensures that “ingenuity . . .
receive[s] a liberal encouragement.” Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. at 308, 100 S.Ct. 2204.
More importantly, as § 101 itself expresses, subject
matter eligibility is merely a threshold check; claim
patentability ultimately depends on “the conditions and
requirements of this title,” such as novelty, nonobviousness, and adequate disclosure. 35 U.S.C. § 101;
see Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC,
659 F.3d 1057, 1064 (Fed.Cir.2011) (pointing out the
difference between “the threshold inquiry of patenteligibility, and the substantive conditions of
patentability”).
By directing attention to these
substantive criteria for patentability, the language of
§ 101 makes clear that the categories of patent-eligible
subject matter are no more than a “coarse eligibility
filter.” Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 869. In other
words, the expansive categories—process, machine,
article of manufacture, and composition of matter—are
certainly not substitutes for the substantive
patentability requirements set forth in § 102, § 103, and
§ 112 and invoked expressly by § 101 itself. Moreover,
title 35 does not list a single ineligible category,
suggesting that any new, non-obvious, and fully
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disclosed technical advance is eligible for protection,
subject to the following limited judicially created
exceptions.
In line with the broadly permissive nature of § 101’s
subject matter eligibility principles, judicial case law
has created only three categories of subject matter
outside the eligibility bounds of § 101—laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. Bilski, 130
S.Ct. at 3225. Indeed, laws of nature and physical
phenomena cannot be invented.
Abstractness,
however, has presented a different set of interpretive
problems, particularly for the § 101 “process” category.
Actually, the term “process” has a statutory definition
that, again, admits of no express subject matter
limitation: a title 35 “process” is a “process, art or
method, and includes a new use of a known process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
material.” 35 U.S.C. § 100(b). Indeed, the Supreme
Court recently examined this definition and found that
the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of
“method” may include even methods of doing business.
See Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3228. Accordingly, the Court
refused to deem business methods ineligible for patent
protection and cautioned against “read[ing] into the
patent laws limitations and conditions which the
legislature has not expressed.” Id. at 3226 (quoting
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67
L.Ed.2d 155 (1981)).
And this court detects no
limitations or conditions on subject matter eligibility
expressed in statutory language. See, e.g., Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1348 (Fed.Cir.2011) (patentineligible categories of subject matter are “judicially
created exceptions”); Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo
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Collaborative
Servs.,
628
F.3d
1347,
1353
(Fed.Cir.2010), cert. granted, —U.S.—, 130 S.Ct. 3543,
177 L.Ed.2d 1120 (2010) (patent-ineligible categories
are “not compelled by the statutory text”); see also
Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3225 (Supreme Court
acknowledging that judge-created “exceptions are not
required by the statutory text”).
In an effort to grapple with the non-statutory
“abstractness” limit, this court at one point set forth a
machine-or-transformation test as the exclusive metric
for determining the subject matter eligibility of
processes.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956
(Fed.Cir.2008), aff’d on other grounds, Bilski, 130 S.Ct.
3218. The Supreme Court rejected this approach in
Bilski, noting that the machine-or-transformation test
is simply “a useful and important clue, an investigative
tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions
are processes under § 101” and is not “the sole test for
deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible
‘process.’” 130 S.Ct. at 3227 (emphasis added). While
machine-or-transformation logic served well as a tool to
evaluate the subject matter of Industrial Age
processes, that test has far less application to the
inventions of the Information Age. See id. at 3227–28
(“[I]n deciding whether previously unforeseen
inventions qualify as patentable ‘processes,’ it may not
make sense to require courts to confine themselves to
asking the questions posed by the machine-ortransformation test. Section 101’s terms suggest that
new technologies may call for new inquiries.”).
Technology without anchors in physical structures and
mechanical steps simply defy easy classification under
the machine-or-transformation categories. As the
Supreme Court suggests, mechanically applying that
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physical test “risk[s] obscuring the larger object of
securing patents for valuable inventions without
transgressing the public domain.” Id. at 3228.
Both members of the Supreme Court and this court
have recognized the difficulty of providing a precise
formula or definition for the judge-made ineligible
category of abstractness. See id. at 3236 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“The Court . . . [has] never provide[d] a
satisfying account of what constitutes an unpatentable
abstract idea.”); Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 868.
Because technology is ever-changing and evolves in
unforeseeable ways, this court gives substantial weight
to the statutory reluctance to list any new, nonobvious, and fully disclosed subject matter as beyond
the reach of title 35. In sum, § 101 is a “dynamic
provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen
inventions.” J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer HiBred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 135, 122 S.Ct. 593, 151
L.Ed.2d 508 (2001). With this in mind, this court does
“not presume to define ‘abstract’ beyond the
recognition that this disqualifying characteristic should
exhibit itself so manifestly as to override the broad
statutory categories of eligible subject matter and the
statutory context that directs primary attention on the
patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.”
Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 868.
Although abstract principles are not eligible for
patent protection, an application of an abstract idea
may well be deserving of patent protection. See Diehr,
450 U.S. at 187, 101 S.Ct. 1048 (“an application of a law
of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591, 98
S.Ct. 2522, 57 L.Ed.2d 451 (1978) (“While a scientific
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truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a
patentable invention, a novel and useful structure
created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth
may be.”). The application of an abstract idea to a “new
and useful end” is the type of invention that the
Supreme Court has described as deserving of patent
protection. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 94
S.Ct. 253, 34 L.Ed.2d 273 (1972). After all, unlike the
Copyright Act which divides idea from expression, the
Patent Act covers and protects any new and useful
technical advance, including applied ideas.
Turning to the ’545 patent, the claimed invention is
a method for monetizing and distributing copyrighted
products over the Internet. As a method, it satisfies
§ 100’s definition of “process” and thus falls within a
§ 101 category of patent-eligible subject matter. Thus,
this court focuses its inquiry on the abstractness of the
subject matter claimed by the ’545 patent.
“[I]nventions with specific applications or
improvements to technologies in the marketplace are
not likely to be so abstract that they override the
statutory language and framework of the Patent Act.”
Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 869. The ’545 patent seeks
to remedy problems with prior art banner advertising,
such as declining click-through rates, by introducing a
method of product distribution that forces consumers
to view and possibly even interact with advertisements
before permitting access to the desired media product.
’545 patent col.2 ll.14–18. By its terms, the claimed
invention purports to improve existing technology in
the marketplace. By its terms, the claimed invention
invokes computers and applications of computer
technology. Of course, the patentability of the ’545
patent, though acknowledged by the U.S. Patent
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Office, would still need to withstand challenges that the
claimed invention does not advance technology
(novelty), does not advance technology sufficiently to
warrant patent protection (obviousness), or does not
sufficiently enable, describe, and disclose the limits of
the invention (adequate disclosure).
Returning to the subject matter of the ’545 patent,
the mere idea that advertising can be used as a form of
currency is abstract, just as the vague, unapplied
concept of hedging proved patent-ineligible in Bilski.
However, the ’545 patent does not simply claim the
age-old idea that advertising can serve as currency.
Instead the ’545 patent discloses a practical application
of this idea. The ’545 patent claims a particular method
for monetizing copyrighted products, consisting of the
following steps: (1) receiving media products from a
copyright holder, (2) selecting an advertisement to be
associated with each media product, (3) providing said
media products for sale on an Internet website, (4)
restricting general public access to the media products,
(5) offering free access to said media products on the
condition that the consumer view the advertising, (6)
receiving a request from a consumer to view the
advertising, (7) facilitating the display of advertising
and any required interaction with the advertising, (8)
allowing the consumer access to the associated media
product after such display and interaction, if any, (9)
recording this transaction in an activity log, and (10)
receiving payment from the advertiser. ’545 patent
col.8 ll.5–48. Many of these steps are likely to require
intricate and complex computer programming. In
addition, certain of these steps clearly require specific
application to the Internet and a cyber-market
environment. One clear example is the third step,
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“providing said media products for sale on an Internet
website.” Id. col.8 ll.20–21. And, of course, if the
products are offered for sale on the Internet, they must
be “restricted”—step four—by complex computer
programming as well. Viewing the subject matter as a
whole, the invention involves an extensive computer
interface. This court does not define the level of
programming complexity required before a computerimplemented method can be patent-eligible. Nor does
this court hold that use of an Internet website to
practice such a method is either necessary or sufficient
in every case to satisfy § 101. This court simply find
the claims here to be patent-eligible, in part because of
these factors.
In this context, this court examines as well the
contention that the software programming necessary
to facilitate the invention deserves no patent protection
or amounts to abstract subject matter or, in the
confusing terminology of machines and physical
transformations, fails to satisfy the “particular
machine” requirement. This court confronted that
contention nearly two decades ago in the en banc case
of In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). At that
time, this court observed that “programming creates a
new machine, because a general purpose computer in
effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is
programmed to perform particular functions pursuant
to instructions from program software.” Id. at 1545.
As computer scientists understand:
the inventor can describe the invention in terms
of a dedicated circuit or a process that emulates
that circuit. Indeed, the line of demarcation
between a dedicated circuit and a computer
algorithm accomplishing the identical task is
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frequently blurred and is becoming increasingly
so as the technology develops. In this field, a
software process is often interchangeable with a
hardware circuit.
Id. at 1583 (J. Rader, concurring). In other words, a
programmed computer contains circuitry unique to
that computer. That “new machine” could be claimed
in terms of a complex array of hardware circuits, or
more efficiently, in terms of the programming that
facilitates a unique function. The digital computer may
be considered by some the greatest invention of the
twentieth century, and both this court and the Patent
Office have long acknowledged that “improvements
thereof” through inter-changeable software or
hardware enhancements deserve patent protection.
Far from abstract, advances in computer technology—
both hardware and software—drive innovation in
every area of scientific and technical endeavor.
This court understands that the broadly claimed
method in the ’545 patent does not specify a particular
mechanism for delivering media content to the
consumer (i.e., FTP downloads, email, or real-time
streaming). This breadth and lack of specificity does
not render the claimed subject matter impermissibly
abstract. Assuming the patent provides sufficient
disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art
to practice the invention and to satisfy the written
description requirement, the disclosure need not detail
the particular instrumentalities for each step in the
process.
That a process may be patentable, irrespective of
the particular form of the instrumentalities used,
cannot be disputed. If one of the steps of a
process be that a certain substance is to be
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reduced to a powder, it may not be at all material
what instrument or machinery is used to effect
that object, whether a hammer, a pestle and
mortar, or a mill.
Benson, 409 U.S. at 69-70, 93 S.Ct. 253 (quoting
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88, 24 L.Ed. 139
(1876)). Moreover, written description and enablement
are conditions for patentability that title 35 sets
“wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a
category of statutory subject matter.” Diehr, 450 U.S.
at 190, 101 S.Ct. 1048 (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d
952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979)). The “coarse eligibility filter”
of § 101 should not be used to invalidate patents based
on concerns about vagueness, indefinite disclosure, or
lack of enablement, as these infirmities are expressly
addressed by § 112. See 35 U.S.C. § 112; see also
Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 869 (“In section 112, the
Patent Act provides powerful tools to weed out claims
that may present a vague or indefinite disclosure of the
invention.”).
Finally, the ’545 patent does not claim a
mathematical algorithm, a series of purely mental
steps, or any similarly abstract concept. It claims a
particular method for collecting revenue from the
distribution of media products over the Internet. In a
recent case, this court discerned that an invention
claimed
an
“unpatentable
mental
process.”
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d
1366, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2011). The eligibility exclusion for
purely mental steps is particularly narrow.
See
Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1358 (noting that claims
must be considered as a whole and that “the presence
of mental steps [in a claim] does not detract from the
patentability of [other] steps”). Unlike the claims in
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CyberSource, the claims here require, among other
things, controlled interaction with a consumer via an
Internet website, something far removed from purely
mental steps.
In sum, as a practical application of the general
concept of advertising as currency and an improvement
to prior art technology, the claimed invention is not “so
manifestly abstract as to override the statutory
language of section 101.” Research Corp., 627 F.3d at
869. Accordingly, this court reverses the district
court’s dismissal of Ultramercial’s patent claims for
lack of subject matter eligibility and remands for
further proceedings. This decision does not opine at all
on the patentability of the claimed invention under the
substantive criteria set forth in § 102, § 103, and § 112.
R EVERSED AND REMANDED
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ULTRAMERCIAL, LLC et al. v. HULU, LLC, et al.
Case No. CV 09-06918 RGK (PLAx)
August 13, 2010
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93453
The Honorable R. GARY KLAUSNER, UNITED
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) Order re:
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (DE 26 and 29)
I.
INTRODUCTION
This is a patent infringement suit brought by
Plaintiff Ultramercial, LLC (“Plaintiff”) against
Defendants Hulu, LLC and Wildtangent, Inc.
(collectively, “Defendants”) for alleged infringement of
U.S. Patent No. 7,346,545 (the ’545 patent). 1 Because
the Court finds that the ’545 patent does not cover
patentable subject matter, it GRANTS Wildtangent,
Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (DE 29). Hulu, LLC’s Motion
to Dismiss (DE 26) is D ENIED as moot.
II.
BACKGROUND
The ’545 patent claims an invention for distributing
copyrighted products over the Internet (or other
1 The Complaint originally named Youtube, LLC, as the third
defendant. The parties, however, have already stipulated to
Youtube, LLC’s dismissal.
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networks). In particular, the ’545 patent discloses a
method for allowing Internet users to view copyrighted
material free of charge in exchange for watching
certain advertisements. A computer or a server acts as
a gateway between the Internet user and the
copyrighted material. An advertisement sponsor may
purchase advertising space for a particular copyrighted
material (a television show episode for example). Upon
attempting to stream a “free” television show episode,
for example, the Internet user will be presented with
advertisement. The user cannot view the copyrighted
material until the ad is fully displayed. The result is
that the viewer gets to watch what he wants for free,
and the sponsor gets to deliver its advertisement to the
intended audience.
The two independent claims of the ’545 patent are
claims 1 and 8. Claim 1, in its entirety, discloses a
number of steps that comprise the process of
displaying advertisement in exchange for access to
copyrighted media. The steps are 1) receiving media
from content provider, 2) selecting an ad after
consulting an activity log to determine how many times
the ad has been played and how many more times it
need be played, 3) offering media products on the
Internet, 4) restricting general public access to the
media, 5) offering various media to customers for free
in exchange for their watching the selected ad, 6)
receiving a request to view the media from the
Internet user, 7) facilitating the display of the ad, 8)
allowing the Internet user access to the media, 9) same
as 8 but for interactive media, 10) recording the
transaction in the activity log, and 11) receiving
payment from sponsor for the ad.
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The second independent claim (claim 8) is almost
identical to claim 1. The differences between the two
independent claims are not material for the purpose of
this Order. The remaining (dependent) claims add
more “steps” to those in the independent claims. For
example, claim 2 discloses “the step of paying royalties
to the content provider.” Claim 3 discloses “the step of
entering into a licensing agreement with the owner of
the intellectual property.” Claim 4 discloses “the step
of barring the content provider from pretending to be a
customer” [to make sure the content provider cannot
artificially inflate the view count]. Claim 5 discloses
“the step of tendering payment to the content
provider.” Claim 6 discloses “the step of issuing [] a
password” to the Internet user.” Claim 7 discloses “the
step of verifying a submitted password.” And so on.
III. JUDICIAL STANDARD
A party may move to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court
must assume that the plaintiff’s allegations are true
and construe the complaint in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Dismissal is
appropriate only where the complaint lacks a
cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a
cognizable legal theory. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp.
Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). “While a
complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to
relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
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will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)
(quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.
Ct. 2832, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986)). The court need not
accept as true unreasonable inferences, unwarranted
deductions of fact, or conclusory legal allegations cast
in the form of factual allegations. W. Mining Council v.
Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).
IV. DISCUSSION
Under the Patent Act of 1952, subject matter
patentability is a threshold requirement. 35 U.S.C
§ 101. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title.” Id. Recently in Bilski
v. Kappos, __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3225, 177 L. Ed.
2d 792 (2010), the Supreme Court emphasized again
that excluded from the patentable subject matter are
“laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas.”
Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s ’545 patent
does not disclose patentable subject matter. Originally,
this Motion was filed before the Supreme Court handed
down the decision in Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3218. In order
to benefit from the Supreme Court’s guidance on the
law regarding patentable subject matter and because
of similarities between the case at hand and Bilski, this
Court stayed the case until the Supreme Court issued
its opinion. Thereafter the parties filed supplemental
briefings, in which they each provide their account of
how the Supreme Court’s decision helps their case.
After having reviewed the filings and the relevant case
law in full, this Court finds that the ’545 patent does
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not disclose patentable subject matter. Not only does
the patent fail the machine or transformation test, it
claims an abstract idea.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s
Complaint should be dismissed.
A . The ’545 Patent Does Not Satisfy the
Machine or Transformation Test
In In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the
Federal Circuit held that a process is not patentable
unless it is “tied to a particular machine,” or
“transforms an article.” The en banc decision produced
various concurring and dissenting opinions, all of which
need not be discussed here. It suffices to mention that
the so called “machine or transformation test,”
according to the majority, was the sole test for
patentability of processes, including business method
and software patents. Id. And since the invention at
issue in Bilski—a method for hedging investments—
did not meet the test, it was held to be invalid. Id.
On Supreme Court review, all Justice agreed that
the Bilski patent was not covered by patentable
subject matter. 130 S.Ct at 3218. How one gets to that
conclusion, however, the Justices did not agree. The
majority opinion thought it too broad to categorically
invalidate all patents that do not meet the machine or
transformation test. Id. at 3226. The machine or
transformation test, according to the Supreme Court,
provided a “useful and important clue,” but it was not
determinative in all situations. Id. at 3227. Instead,
the inquiry should be whether the claimed invention is
a “law of nature, physical phenomena,” or an “abstract
idea[].” Id. at 3226. Yet the Supreme Court did not
offer an example of an invention that would not be tied
to a machine or transform an article and still pass the
subject matter test. The Court stopped at holding that
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the Bilski patent disclosed an abstract idea—the idea
of hedging investments—and therefore, regardless of
the machine or transformation test, it was invalid. Id.
at 3230-31.
It is important to note, however, that even after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski, the machine or
transformation test appears to have a major screening
function—albeit
not
perfect—that
separates
unpatentable ideas from patentable ones. Indeed, four
of the Justices, listed on Justice Stevens’s concurring
opinion, would have taken the machine or
transformation test to its logical limit to hold that
business methods are categorically unpatentable. Id.
at 3257 (Stevens, J., concurring). Joining a concurring
opinion, Justice Scalia, who signed on to parts of the
plurality opinion as well, would not hold all business
methods unpatentable, but would agree with Justice
Breyer that “not [] many patentable processes lie
beyond [the] reach [of the machine or transformation
test].” Id. at 3258 (Breyer, J., concurring). In sum, at
least five (and maybe all) Justices seem to agree that
the machine or transformation test should retain much
of its utility after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bilski.
Therefore, even though the machine or
transformation is no longer the litmus test for
patentability, the Court will use it here as a key
indicator of patentability.
Turning to the mechanics of the test itself, the
Court notes that not every patent that recites a
machine or transformation of an article passes the
machine or transformation test. Bilski, 545 F.3d at
961. A mere recitation of a machine or transformation
in the claim will not suffice because “[i]nsignificant
postsolution activity will not transform an
unpatentable principle into a patentable process.” Id.
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The machine or transformation “must impose
meaningful limits on the claim’s scope to impart patenteligibility.” Id. (citation omitted). Below, the Court
finds that the ’545 patent does not satisfy the machine
or transformation test.
1. The ’545 Patent Is Not Tied to a Machine
A machine is a “concrete thing, consisting of parts
or of certain devices and combination of devices.” In re
Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 2 Yet,
physical steps are not needed to allow a process claim
to be patentable. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961. As long
as the invention is tied to a machine or transforms an
article, it may be patentable notwithstanding its lack of
physical steps. Id.
The two independent claims of the ’545 patent
recite the steps of exchanging media for advertisement
viewing. There are only three points in the ’545 patent
that the parties have identified as a possible reference
to a machine.
The first two (“facilitator” and
“Internet”) appear in the independent claims (1 and 8):
“A method for distribution of products over the
Internet via a facilitator.” The third appears in
dependent claim 16: “The method . . . wherein media
product accessed by the consumer is downloaded to a
memory of a personal computer of the consumer.” The
Court finds that none of the three satisfy the machine
prong of the test.

2 It was undisputed in Bilski that the machine part of the
machine or transformation test was not satisfied. 545 F.3d at 962.
Therefore, Bilski does not provide much guidance on how to apply
the machine prong of the test.
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Despite Plaintiff’s argument, the “facilitator”
recitation does not meet the machine requirement.
First, there is no reason to read “facilitator” as a
machine such as a computer. Indeed, the patent
specification suggests the contrary: the schematics in
the patent specification depict the facilitator as a
person. Moreover, the ’545 patent explains that the
facilitator may “communicate through . . . telephony,
facsimile, courier, mail or even person-to-person
meeting.” The specification makes it clear, therefore,
that the ’545 patent is not aimed at a computer-specific
application; it is a broad claim to the concept of
exchanging media for advertisement viewing.
Neither does the “Internet” recitation save the
patent. First, this Court agrees with the District
Court in the Northern District of California that held
the Internet is not a machine. CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (“[T]he Internet is an abstraction.” “One can
touch a computer or a network cable, but one cannot
touch ‘the internet.’”). In CyberSource, the court held
that methods for “detecting fraud in credit card
transaction between consumer and merchant over the
Internet were not tied to a specific machine.” Id. at
1077-78 (emphasis added). This Court agrees in full
with the court’s reasoning in CyberSource to the effect
that the “over the Internet” recitation does not make
an otherwise unpatentable idea patentable. Id.
Finally, the mere act of storing media on computer
memory does not tie the ’545 invention to a machine in
any meaningful way. Since Plaintiff does not argue this
point, the Court will not address it in detail. It suffices
to say, however, that the argument would have been
too farfetched and hence futile.
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Plaintiff makes two counter arguments that need be
addressed. First, Plaintiff points to many steps in the
’545 patent that, according to Plaintiff, address
computer-specific functions (such as issuing and
verifying passwords, transmitting an ad until it is
timed out, making content physically available to the
consumer, etc.). (Pl. Opp., at 16.) Second, Plaintiff
argues that the segments of the patent specification
quoted here only says that “some communication [may]
take place without a programmed machine (e.g.,
communication between a IP rights holder and
interposed sponsor),” but “all communication between
the consumer and facilitator take place utilizing a
specifically-programmed computer.” 3 (Pl. Opp., at
17:25-18:15.) In sum, Plaintiff argues that the ’545
patent is computer-specific and not a broad invention
that may be performed by a person. As a result,
Plaintiff suggests that the ’545 patent meets the
machine prong of the test.

3 The preferred embodiment specification states in pertinent
part,
In accordance with the preferred embodiment, four principals
are preferably present: a facilitator, a consumer, an
intellectual property (IP) rights holder, and an interposed
sponsor. All of the principals preferably communicate over a
telecommunications network such as the Internet, using their
respective computers: facilitator’s computer, consumer’s
computer, IP rights holder’s computer 30A and interposed
sponsor’s computer. Three of the principals (facilitator, IP
rights holder and interposed sponsor) may also communicate
through a twoway communications path, which may include
telephony, facsimile, courier, mail or even person-to-person
meetings.

63a
Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing. There is nothing
inherently computer-specific about receiving media
from a content provider, choosing a sponsor for the
media, selecting an ad for the sponsor, verifying the
viewer’s activity, assigning passwords, charging the
sponsor for the advertisement, or any of the remaining
steps.
Yet Plaintiff is perhaps still correct to point out that
the only useful application of Plaintiff’s invention is
with relation to the Internet, where the facilitator is a
specifically “programmed computer.” 4 That does not
mean, however, that the patent claims are limited to
use on a computer, or, more importantly, that they are
tied to one. That the disclosed invention is only used on
computers or computer networks cannot alone satisfy
the machine test without rendering the test completely
toothless. 5 As already stated above, the machine must
limit the invention in a meaningful way. One cannot
circumvent the patentability test by merely limiting
the use of the invention to a computer. The binary
representation, one of the most fundamental concepts
that has enabled digital computation as we know it
today was not patentable, even though its utility was
4 The “programmed computer” argument has its origin in In
re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). That decision
articulated the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test for
patentable subject matter, which was subsequently abrogated by
the Federal Circuit in Bilski 545 F.3d at 959-60.
5 The Court is aware that software patents or other method
patents that involve programmed computers have never been
categorically rejected under the patentable subject matter test.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972) (declining to hold that
all patents for any “program servicing a computer” are invalid
under § 101).
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linked to “general-purpose digital computers.”
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972). Similarly
in the case of the ’545 patent, the concept of
advertisement-media-exchange does not become
patentable simply because the patentee claims to have
limited its application to the Internet or computers.
Therefore, the ’545 patent fails the machine test.
2. The ’545 Patent Does Not Transform an
Article
There can be little dispute that the ’545 patent does
not transform an article.
“Transformation and
reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is
the clue to the patentability of a process claim that
does not include particular machines.” Id. at 70. None
of the patent claims disclose a transformation. Plaintiff
points to claim 16, which recites, “The method . . .
wherein media product accessed by the consumer is
downloaded to a memory of a personal computer of the
consumer.” Yet the mere transfer of data from one
memory disk on one computer to another memory
space in a second computer is not “transformation of
article” under § 101. And the parties have not pointed
out a case that held otherwise. That is not surprising:
the nature of the computer memory does not vary
based on what is stored in it. And even if storing
content on a computer memory constituted
transforming an article, Plaintiff’s argument would still
fail because such “transformation” is merely incidental
to the ’545 patent claims. What Plaintiff claims is the
process of trading viewing of the advertisements for
free access to media.
That the media may be
transferred from one computer (or server) to another is
merely incidental. Cf. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175
(1981) (holding that the method of using temperature
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readings from a rubber press and inputting the reading
in a well-known mathematical formula to determine
accurately the cure-time was patentable because the
process was meaningfully limited to transformation of
an article). Unlike in Diehr, the ’545 patent does not
disclose a method for transforming an article, or the
transformation disclosed is not a meaningful limitation
to the claimed invention.
Therefore, the
transformation prong of the test is also not satisfied.
B. The ’545 Patent Discloses an Abstract Idea
In Bilski, the Supreme Court held that a method
for hedging investments was an abstract idea and
hence unpatentable. 130 S.Ct. at 3218. Claim 1 of the
Bilski patent simply disclosed a number of steps in a
particular hedging method: 1) trading commodity with
a buyer at a price based on historical averages and the
buyer’s risk position, 2) finding buyers that have
another type of risk position that counters the first
buyer in step one, and 3) transacting with the second
consumer in a way to balance (hedge) the risk of the
transaction. Id. at 3223-24. The patent then went on to
disclose the application of this method in trading
energy commodities. Id. at 3224.
In rejecting the patent, the Supreme Court first
noted that “hedging is a fundamental economic
practice.” Id. at 3231. Therefore, the core of the patent
was not patentable because “allowing petitioners to
patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this
approach in all fields.” Id. Moreover, the remaining
recitations did not rescue the patent because they were
only “broad examples of how hedging can be used in
commodities and energy markets.” Id. Since the core
of the patent was an abstract idea, and the additional
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limitations did not meaningfully contain the claimed
invention, the Bilski invention was not patentable.
The case at hand is very similar. At the core of the
’545 patent is the basic idea that one can use
advertisement as an exchange or currency.
An
Internet user can pay for copyrighted media by sitting
through a sponsored message instead of paying money
to download the media. This core principle, similar to
the core of the Bilski patent, is an abstract idea.
Indeed, public television channels have used the same
basic idea for years to provide free (or offset the cost
of) media to their viewers. 6 At its heart, therefore, the
patent does no more than disclose an abstract idea.
Also similar to the patent in Bilski, the added
features, examples, or limitations of the ’545 patent do
not make it patentable.
That the exchange
(advertisement for media) is carried over the Internet,
through a facilitator, using passwords and activity logs,
does not limit the patent in a meaningful way. The
patent still discloses an abstract idea garnished with
accessories.
If the claimed invention here were
patentable, it would “preempt use of this [method] in
all fields.” Id.
Two points need be made clear at the end. One is
that the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that this
Motion should not be decided before claim construction.
While the Court (and the parties) consulted the claims
6 The Court is cognizant of the difference between patentable
subject matter and obviousness requirements. The point made
here is that the core of the disclosed invention is an abstract
principle similar to the hedging principle in Bilski; lack of novelty
is not the (intended) message. Although the invention here may
obvious, that determination is not before the Court.

67a
and the specification, there is no need to formally
construe any of the claims. The patent terms are clear,
and Plaintiff has not brought to the Court’s attention
any reasonable construction that would bring the
patent within patentable subject matter. Moreover,
given the lack of clarity in this area of patent law, it is
perhaps even more appropriate for this Court to
render its decision at the earliest stage so that the
parties may benefit from the Federal Circuit’s
guidance on the issue sooner rather than later, if they
so desire.
Second, the Court acknowledges that this case calls
for the difficult task of deciphering whether the ’545
invention falls under the Bilski or Diehr categories. In
both, the claimed invention discloses a real-world
application of a mathematical formula. In both, a wellknown or basic principle is linked to its practical use.
Yet in one (Diehr), the invention is patentable; in the
other (Bilski), not. In deciding which one of the two
categories the ’545 patent fits, the Court consulted the
machine or transformation test. The Court also noted
that the similarities between the ’545 patent and the
Bilski patent point toward invalidity. Finally, the
Court noted that the additional limitations beyond the
abstract idea at the core of the ’545 patent do not limit
the claimed invention in a meaningful way. Therefore,
the Court holds that the ’545 patent does not cover
patentable subject matter.
V.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Wildtangent, Inc.’s Motion to
Dismiss (DE 29). Hulu, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss (DE
26) is D ENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
WILDTANGENT, INC., Petitioner,
v.
ULTRAMERCIAL, LLC, et al.
No. 11-962.
May 21, 2012.
132 S. Ct. 2431
On petition for writ of certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment
vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for further
consideration in light of Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.
, 132 S. Ct. 1289,
182 L. Ed. 2d 321 (2012).
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
2010-1544
ULTRAMERCIAL, LLC and ULTRAMERCIAL,
INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
HULU, LLC,
Defendant,
and
WILDTANGENT, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of California in case no. 09-CV-6918,
Judge R. Gary Klausner.
ORDER
A petition for rehearing en banc having been filed
by the Appellee, * and the matter having first been
referred as a petition for rehearing to the panel that
heard the appeal, and thereafter the petition for
rehearing en banc having been referred to the circuit
judges who are in regular active service,
UPON CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is
ORDERED that the petition for rehearing be, and
the same hereby is, DENIED and it is further

* The court granted Electronic Frontier Foundation, et al.
leave to file a brief amici curiae in support of Appellee’s petition
for rehearing en banc.
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ORDERED that the petition for rehearing en banc
be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.
The mandate of the court will issue on November
28, 2011.
Circuit Judge Moore did not participate in the vote.
FOR THE COURT,
s/Jan Horbaly /LB
Jan Horbaly
Clerk
Dated: 11/18/2011
cc:

Lawrence M. Hadley
Darin W. Snyder, Gregory G. Garre
Julie Samuels
[File stamp omitted]

ULTRAMERCIAL V HULU, 2010-1544
(DCT - 09-CV-6918)
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
2010-1544
ULTRAMERCIAL, LLC and ULTRAMERCIAL,
INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
HULU, LLC,
Defendant,
and
WILDTANGENT, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of California in case no. 09-CV-6918,
Judge R. Gary Klausner.
ORDER
A petition for hearing en banc having been filed by
the Appellee,
UPON CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is
ORDERED that the petition for rehearing be, and
the same hereby is, DENIED.
Circuit Judge Moore did not participate in the vote.
FOR THE COURT,
s/Jan Horbaly
Jan Horbaly
Clerk
Dated: 09/24/2012
cc:
Lawrence M. Hadley
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Darin W. Snyder
Gregory G. Garre
Julie P. Samuels
Peter J. Brann
Daryl Joseffer
[File stamp omitted]
ULTRAMERCIAL V HULU, 2010-1544
(DCT - 09-CV-6918)
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U.S. CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE I
Section 8.
The Congress shall have power . . .
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries;
***
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35 U.S.C. § 100
§ 100. Definitions
When used in this title unless the context otherwise
indicates—
***
(b) The term “process” means process, art or
method, and includes a new use of a known process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
material.
***
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35 U.S.C. § 101
§ 101. Inventions patentable
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title.

